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Criminal Labor Law 
Benjamin Levin† 
This Article examines a recent rise in civil suits brought against unions 
under criminal statutes. By looking at the long history of criminal 
regulation of labor, the Article argues that these suits represent an attack 
on the theoretical underpinnings of post-New Deal U.S. labor law and an 
attempt to revive a nineteenth century conception of unions as extortionate 
criminal conspiracies. The Article further argues that this criminal turn is 
reflective of a broader contemporary preference for finding criminal 
solutions to social and economic problems. In a moment of political 
gridlock, parties seeking regulation increasingly do so via criminal statute. 
In this respect, “criminal labor law” should pose concerns, not only for 
scholars concerned about workplace democracy, but also those focused on 
overcriminalization and the increasing scope of criminal law. 
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Labor law is dead, or at least so say the labor law scholars.1 Almost 
eighty years after the passage of the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA” or “Wagner Act”),2 a statute that ushered in a new era of legal 
recognition for organized labor, traditional, private-sector labor law 
doctrine has stagnated. In 1983, Paul Weiler wrote that “American labor 
law more and more resembles an elegant tombstone for a dying 
institution.”3 A decade later, James Brudney observed that “collective 
action appears moribund.”4 And, in her 2002 article The Ossification of 
American Labor Law,5 Cynthia Estlund wrote that “[e]vidence of [labor 
law’s] morbidity abounds . . . . [L]abor laws have failed to deliver an 
effective mechanism of workplace representation, and have become nearly 
irrelevant, to the vast majority of private sector American workers.”6 
Certainly, some U.S. workers are still unionized; unions continue to 
organize shops; and courts continue to rule on legal questions relating to 
union elections, dues, and political contributions. However, as the 
unionized portion of the U.S. workforce continues to dwindle, the statutory 
protections and requirements of the NLRA have ceased to occupy the 
privileged position they once held as the critical legal regulations 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening Up the 
Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 827-28 (1996); Michael H. Gottesman, 
In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59 
(1993); Joel Rogers, Reforming U.S. Labor Relations, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97 (1993); Benjamin 
Sachs, Revitalizing Labor Law, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 333, 334 (2010) (“[F]or more than three 
decades now, labor scholars have been withering in their criticism of the National Labor Relations Act. 
The critique is that the statute fails to fulfill its central statutory purposes.”); Benjamin I. Sachs, 
Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2694-2700 (2008) [hereinafter Sachs, 
Employment Law as Labor Law]; Ahmed A. White, Workers Disarmed: The Campaign Against Mass 
Picketing and the Dilemma of Liberal Labor Rights, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 59, 123 (2014) 
[hereinafter White, Workers Disarmed] (“[T]he system of liberal labor law erected by the Wagner Act 
and the Taft-Hartley Act lingers in place, even as the rights the acts purport to advance and the future of 
the labor movement both teeter on the edge of extinction.”). 
 2.  Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 
(2012)). 
 3.  Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the 
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1769 (1983). 
 4.  James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 1563, 1563 (1996). 
 5.  Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527 
(2002); cf. Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal 
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978) (arguing that the Wagner Act failed to 
vindicate the pro-union values that led to its passage, ultimately yielding an economic and legal climate 
hostile to unionization). 
 6.  Estlund, supra note 5, at 1527-28. 
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undergirding the nation’s labor markets.7 The doctrine taught in a traditional 
labor law course—the NLRA and the statutory scheme of which it is a 
part8—increasingly has become a niche area of legal practice, rather than 
the essential component of a workplace lawyer’s toolkit. 
The responses to the obsolescence consensus have been creative and 
varied. Indeed, “the field is beginning the process of reinvention,”9 with 
labor lawyers, activists, and scholars attempting to imagine new 
frameworks or identify different legal regimes that might be able to fill the 
gaps in the regulation of the workplace.10 Some have focused on 
employment law or immigration statutes as vehicles through which to 
advance workers’ interests,11 while others have argued for a more expansive 
definition of “unions,” directing attention less to the formal strictures of the 
NLRA and more to methods of facilitating collective action or voice in 
workplace and political arenas.12 Still others have identified pre-election, 
private arrangements between unions and employers as the new locus for 
legal and scholarly intervention.13 Proponents of unionization have not 
given up on the project of organizing workers or re-situating the balance of 
power between workers and employers, but they have recognized a need to 
confront and incorporate other doctrinal realms in their analysis. 
This Article enters the realm of extra-NLRA (or, post-NLRA) labor 
law scholarship, but does so by emphasizing a largely under-explored and 
ostensibly anachronistic dimension of contemporary labor regulation: 
 
 7.  See Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 375-76 (2007) 
[hereinafter Sachs, Labor Law Renewal]. 
 8.  Doctrinal NLRA labor law, combined with later statutory additions, comprises a legal scheme 
concerned primarily with the organizing and bargaining rights of unions and unionizing workers. See 
Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, supra note 1, at 2688. 
 9.  Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, supra note 7, at 376. 
 10.  See infra notes 11-13. 
 11.  See, e.g., Ellen Dannin, Hoffman Plastics As Labor Law––Equality at Last for Immigrant 
Workers?, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 393 (2009); Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of 
American Work Law, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 165 (2007); Sachs, Employment Law as 
Labor Law, supra note 1. 
 12.  See generally CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC 
RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2005); Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Beyond Unions, 
Notwithstanding Labor Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 561 (2014); Catherine L. Fisk, Reimagining 
Collective Rights in the Workplace, 4 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 523 (2014); Catherine L. Fisk & Benjamin I. 
Sachs, Restoring Equity in Right-to-Work Law, 4 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 857 (2014); Benjamin I. Sachs, 
The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123 YALE L. J. 148 (2013). 
 13.  See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects 
for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 825 (2005); Laura J. Cooper, Privatizing Labor Law: 
Neutrality/Card Check Agreements and the Role of the Arbitrator, 83 IND. L.J. 1589, 1591 (2008); Zev 
J. Eigen & David Sherwyn, A Moral/Contractual Approach to Labor Law Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 
695, 697 (2012); Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor 
Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 370-
72 (2001). 
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criminal law.14 In this respect, this Article not only uses criminal law as a 
frame for examining labor law, but it also uses labor law as a lens through 
which to address the role of criminal law as a social-structuring mechanism. 
Dating to the early nineteenth century, the legal paradigm for worker 
organizing was criminal, with organizing workers subjected to conspiracy 
prosecutions.15 In the twentieth century, the Norris-LaGuardia Act,16 the 
New Deal, and the Wagner Act brought about a period of union legitimacy, 
but criminal law has never lost its hold entirely, as Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”)17 prosecutions and federal 
investigations have maintained a cloud of venality over unions.18 
Today, criminal law is hardly the dominant mode of regulating unions, 
but labor law is showing its criminal roots. The era of outright criminal 
prohibitions on unionization is long gone,19 but criminal statutes remain a 
component of the legal web that structures labor markets. Indeed, despite 
the attention paid to how other doctrinal areas interact with the NLRA, in 
the current moment of labor law “ossification” and declining union power, 
criminal statutes have become new weapons for union opponents seeking 
novel angles of attack.20 Therefore, this Article contends, criminal law 
remains pertinent to the question of unions’ continuing relevance and 
 
 14.  As discussed in Part II.A, infra, scholars have devoted much attention to the criminal 
dimensions of labor law as a historical matter. However, scholarly attention to labor law’s criminal 
dimensions (or criminal law’s labor dimensions) tends to dissipate as discussions move from the purely 
historical to the current moment of workplace regulation. Indeed, most of the work on this relationship 
tends to take as its endpoint the legal treatments of the ties between organized crime and the Teamsters. 
See, e.g., JAMES B. JACOBS & KERRY T. COOPERMAN, BREAKING THE DEVIL’S PACT: THE BATTLE TO 
FREE THE TEAMSTERS FROM THE MOB (2011); JAMES B. JACOBS, MOBSTERS, UNIONS, AND FEDS: THE 
MAFIA AND THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (2006).  
 15.  See generally CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1993) [hereinafter TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY]; CHRISTOPHER L. 
TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR 
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960 (1985) [hereinafter TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS]; 
MARJORIE S. TURNER, THE EARLY AMERICAN LABOR CONSPIRACY CASES, THEIR PLACE IN LABOR 
LAW: A REINTERPRETATION (1967); Morris D. Forkosch, The Doctrine of Criminal Conspiracy and Its 
Modern Application to Labor, 40 TEX. L. REV. 303 (1962); Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in 
American Law, 1880-1930, 66 TEX. L. REV. 919 (1988); Benjamin Levin, Blue-Collar Crime: 
Conspiracy, Organized Labor, and the Anti-Union Civil RICO Claim, 75 ALB. L. REV. 559, 574-87 
(2012) [hereinafter Levin, Blue-Collar Crime]; Benjamin Levin, American Gangsters: RICO, Criminal 
Syndicates, and Conspiracy Law As Market Control, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 120 (2013) 
[hereinafter Levin, American Gangsters]. 
 16.  Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (2012)). 
 17.  Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941-44 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1961-1968 (2011)). 
 18.  See generally, Levin, Blue-Collar Crime, supra note 15 (describing the relationship between 
criminal law and the cultural framing of unions); Ahmed A. White, The Crime of Economic Radicalism: 
Criminal Syndicalism Laws and the Industrial Workers of the World, 1917-1927, 85 OR. L. REV. 649 
(2006) [hereinafter White, Economic Radicalism] (describing criminal law’s role in marginalizing labor 
radicalism).  
 19.  See generally Levin, Blue-Collar Crime, supra note 15, at 587-96. 
 20.  See infra Part III. 
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viability. While most “new labor law scholarship” that looks beyond the 
NLRA focuses on the potential benefits of alternate legal regimes,21 this 
Article highlights the way in which venturing outside of doctrinal federal 
labor law is not without its risks. The NLRA may have ceased to do much 
work as a tool for pro-unionization advocates, but it still represented a 
departure from and an obstacle to criminal regulation.22 Looking beyond the 
NLRA means not only embracing possible alternate vehicles for worker 
collective action, but also confronting a new (or old) set of attacks. 
Stepping away from strict adherence to the labor preemption doctrine offers 
flexibility and promises for more vital worker organizing. But without the 
shield of the NLRA and preemption, worker organizing faces a range of 
legal assaults. 
Through a set of controversial, quasi-criminal statutory mechanisms, 
opponents of organized labor have harnessed criminal statutes and criminal 
law principles as a means of fighting unionization campaigns.23 
Specifically, criminal law has reared its head in two significant arenas as a 
vehicle for regulating the workplace: civil suits brought pursuant to RICO 
and § 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA” or “Taft-
Hartley Act”)24—both federal felony provisions. 
First, recent decades have seen a rise in largely unsuccessful RICO 
suits brought by employers against unions engaged in aggressive organizing 
drives known as “corporate campaigns”25 or “comprehensive campaigns.”26 
The central allegation in these suits is that the organizing campaign itself 
amounts to extortion, as defined in the criminal context by the Hobbs Act.27 
 
 21.  E.g., Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, supra note 7, at 376-77. 
 22.  Cf. id. at 375 (“When it came to labor law’s core functions––facilitating and regulating the 
self-organization of workers and the collective interactions between labor and management––there was 
to be a single legal channel: Neither other federal laws nor state or local legislation was to interfere with 
the dominance of the NLRA and its administrative agency, the National Labor Relations Board.”). 
 23.  See infra Part III. 
 24.  29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2) (2012). 
 25.  See James J. Brudney, Collateral Conflict: Employer Claims of RICO Extortion Against 
Union Comprehensive Campaigns, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 731, 738 (2010) [hereinafter Brudney, Collateral 
Conflict] (“These campaigns may be broadly defined as union attempts to influence company practices 
that affect key union goals—securing recognition and bargaining for improved working conditions—by 
generating various forms of extrinsic pressure on the company’s top policymakers.”). 
 26.  See, e.g., Cintas Corp. v. UNITE HERE, 601 F. Supp. 2d 571, 574 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 355 F. 
App’x 508 (2d Cir. 2009); Wackenhut Corp. v. SEIU, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1290 (S.D. Fla. 2009); 
Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 585 F. Supp. 2d 815, 817 
(E.D. Va. 2008); A. Terzi Prods., Inc. v. Theatrical Protective Union, 2 F. Supp. 2d 485, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998); Petrochem Insulation, Inc. v. N. Cal. & N. Nev. Pipe Trades Counsel, No. C-90-3628 EFL, 1991 
WL 158701, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 1991), aff’d sub nom. Petrochem Insulation, Inc. v. United Ass’n 
of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Indus. of the U.S. & Can., No. 92-15511, 
1993 WL 378807 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1993); Brudney, Collateral Conflict, supra note 25, at 737-39; 
Levin, Blue-Collar Crime, supra note 15, at 619-23. 
 27.  18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012). 
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That is, a union is guilty of extortion if it attempts to organize a shop and 
exact concessions from an employer. 
Second, workers, frequently represented by the National Right to Work 
Legal Defense Foundation, or other anti-union organizations, have sued 
both unions and employers, asserting claims under § 302 of the LMRA. 
Section 302 makes it a felony for an employer to give or for a union to 
receive any “thing of value” (subject to limited exceptions).28 Asserting an 
implied private right of action under the criminal statute, the § 302 plaintiffs 
have alleged that pre-election neutrality agreements29 between employers 
and unions amount to felonious corrupt bargaining.30 While both the RICO 
and § 302 suits are framed as civil actions and are brought by private 
parties, they tend to rest on legal arguments that—if accepted by the 
courts—would make a victory for the plaintiff(s) amount to a holding that 
the defendant(s) had more likely than not committed a felony. 
Invoking the historical framing of labor’s criminal regulation, this 
Article explores the problems inherent in the use of criminal statutes and 
quasi-criminal civil suits as a means of disciplining labor markets. In 
focusing on the recent RICO and LMRA actions, this Article identifies two 
major problems with this civil-criminal hybrid as a legal avenue for 
challenges to union activity. First, this Article argues that private suits 
brought pursuant to criminal statutes create a troubling dynamic by which 
plaintiffs may act as private prosecutors, essentially obtaining declaratory 
relief that the union (in the case of the RICO suits) or the union and the 
employer (in the case of the § 302 suits) have committed felonies. Although 
similar civil-criminal hybrids exist under other statutory schemes,31 this 
 
 28.  See, e.g., Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 355, 667 F.3d 1211, 1213-14 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted, 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013), and cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 822 (2013), and cert. dismissed as 
improvidently granted, 134 S. Ct. 594 (2013). 
 29.  “Typically, a ‘card check’ or ‘neutrality’ agreement is an agreement between the employer 
and the union ‘in which they agree that (a) the employer will not speak for or against the union 
(neutrality) and/or (b) the employer will recognize the union if it can get signed authorization cards from 
a majority of the unit members (card-check).’” Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 371 n.1 (4th 
Cir. 2008) (quoting Matthew T. Bodie, The Market for Union Services: Reframing the Debate, 94 VA. L. 
REV. IN BRIEF 23, 26-27 (2008)). See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 13, at 825; Cooper, supra note 13, at 
1591 (“The story of neutrality agreements begins with unions’ frustrations in trying to counteract the 
decline in union density in the latter half of the twentieth century.”); Brishen Rogers, “Acting Like a 
Union”: Protecting Workers’ Free Choice by Promoting Workers’ Collective Action, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 38, 38-39 (2010).  
 30.  See generally Part III.B, infra. 
 31.  See infra note 265 and accompanying text. See also Note, Using Equitable Powers to 
Coordinate Parallel Civil and Criminal Actions, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1023, 1023 n.5 (1985) (“Parallel 
civil actions may be completed before the criminal action has commenced or may proceed concurrently 
with criminal actions. Examples include taxpayer suits for refunds during prosecutions for tax fraud, 
wrongful death damage actions against persons accused of criminal negligence, actions to require 
criminal defendants to forfeit ownership of property used in crime, business or professional license 
revocation proceedings resulting from criminal indictments, and civil actions for violations of antitrust, 
securities, or banking laws, or laws regulating the use of drugs or cosmetics.”). However, as discussed at 
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Article argues that the unique history of labor’s relationship to state 
violence makes this dynamic particularly troubling in the union context. 
Second, this Article contends that continued use of these criminal statutes is 
illustrative of a broader pattern in the U.S. legal system whereby criminal 
solutions and the ostensible moral clarity of criminal sanctions are preferred 
over civil remedial or regulatory schemes. This Article further argues that 
the contemporary vitality of these criminal provisions and principles of 
criminal liability in the union context: (1) perpetuates the cultural ties 
between workers’ collective action and criminality, and (2) reinforces 
societal preferences for criminal legislation over civil regulatory or tort 
principles. 
In examining the criminal dimensions of labor law and the role of 
hybrid civil-criminal enforcement mechanisms in resolving labor disputes, 
this Article proceeds in three Parts. The first Part briefly outlines the long 
history of criminal prohibitions on unionization and criminal prosecutions 
relating to organized labor. This Part begins with the nineteenth century 
conspiracy prosecutions of trade unionists; arrives at the passage of the 
NLRA and its attendant legitimation and legalization of certain forms of 
organizing activity; and finally addresses criminal law’s continued 
application to unions in the ensuing decades. This brief history addresses 
the shift from a criminalization of unionization in and of itself to the use of 
criminal law to police the conduct of union members and officials. In 
tracing this evolution, this Part also notes the imagined identity of the 
victim (e.g., the state, the market, the employer, or the worker) under each 
scheme. 
The second Part focuses specifically on the § 302 and civil RICO suits, 
addressing the issues inherent in private rights of action under criminal 
statutes. In doing so, this Part emphasizes the peculiar dynamic whereby a 
judge may rule, as a matter of law, that a felony has more likeley than not 
been committed before a prosecutor has brought charges. Even if 
prosecutions have not yet followed, they might come on the heels of such a 
suit in the right political moment. Further, the invocation of the state’s 
authority to exact criminal punishment still brings with it the social stigma 
and moral component that—punishment theorists argue—are critical 
distinguishing features between civil and criminal liability.32 Because these 
private suits have not been followed by state action and the attendant state 
violence of punishment, we have not been forced to confront the 
 
length infra, this Article argues that this dynamic is particularly troubling in the context of labor law and 
may also serve as a useful illustration of certain pathologies of criminal law. See infra Parts III-IV. 
 32.  See, e.g., Donald Dripps, The Exclusivity of the Criminal Law: Toward A “Regulatory 
Model” of, or “Pathological Perspective” on, the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 199 (1996); Victor Tadros, Criminalization and Regulation, in THE BOUNDARIES OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 163 (R.A. Duff et al. eds., 2010). 
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pathologies of criminal law. Should we be disturbed by the blending of civil 
and criminal principles that normalizes the criminal in private disputes?33 
Following on this question, the third Part steps back from the 
discussion of the specific statutes and addresses the civil-criminal 
distinction as it applies to the contemporary treatment of organized labor. 
First, this Part emphasizes the special significance of criminal law and state 
violence in the labor context. This Part then identifies the potential costs of 
continuing to use criminal law to regulate unions in the workplace, using 
“criminal labor law” as a lens to examine social choices about criminal 
law’s reach. Entering into conversation with a growing literature on the 
relationship between criminalization and economic regulation,34 this Part 
emphasizes the trade-offs inherent in employing criminal rather than civil 
methods to structure labor markets and discipline the workplace. 
Ultimately, this Part argues that a civil-criminal hybrid approach that 
continues to rely on criminal statutes obscures the crucial analysis of social 
costs that should accompany decisions to use criminal solutions to solve 
social and economic problems. That is, the turn to criminal statutes or the 
language of criminal liability normalizes and naturalizes a legal realm that 
should be both distinct and exceptional. 
II. 
LABOR’S CRIMINAL HISTORY 
The story of organized labor in the United States begins with criminal 
prosecutions. This Part does not purport to tell exhaustively the 
criminalization and decriminalization story that has been told many times 
before;35 instead, this Part provides a brief overview, highlighting the 
 
 33.  Cf. Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil 
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 809-13 (1997) (discussing the fraught relationship between civil 
and criminal punishments). 
 34.  See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE 
MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER (2011); Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 578 
(2012); Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph over Administrative Law, 7 J.L. ECON. 
& POL’Y 657, 659 (2011) [hereinafter Brown, Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph]; Darryl K. Brown, 
The Problematic and Faintly Promising Dynamics of Corporate Crime Enforcement, 1 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 521 (2004); Bernard E. Harcourt, On the American Paradox of Laissez Faire and Mass 
Incarceration, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 54 (2012); Matthew Titolo, Privatization and the Market Frame, 
60 BUFF. L. REV. 493, 509 (2012); Robert Weisberg, Reality-Challenged Philosophies of Punishment, 
95 MARQ. L. REV. 1203, 1213 (2012). 
 35.  See, e.g., supra note 15 (collecting sources); WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING 
OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991); JOHN V. ORTH, COMBINATION AND CONSPIRACY: A 
LEGAL HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM, 1721-1906 (1991); SAMUEL YELLEN, AMERICAN LABOR 
STRUGGLES: 1877-1934 (1936); William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1989); Raymond Hogler, Law, Ideology, and Industrial Discipline: The 
Conspiracy Doctrine and the Rise of the Factory System, 91 DICK. L. REV. 697 (1987); Gary Minda, The 
Common Law, Labor and Antitrust, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 461 (1989); Wythe Holt, Labor Conspiracy 
Cases in the United States, 1805-1842: Bias and Legitimation in Common Law Adjudication, 22 
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shifting status of organized labor and shifting legal attitudes towards 
unions’ place in U.S. social, economic, and political life. To this end, the 
Part proceeds in three loosely chronological sections: (1) a pre-history of 
contemporary labor law, focusing on the criminal conspiracy as the 
operative regulatory paradigm; (2) the passage of the Wagner Act and the 
attendant moment of de-criminalization; and (3) the post-Wagner Act re-
imposition of criminal strictures on organized labor. In providing this 
historical grounding, this Part further emphasizes the peculiar nature of 
“labor law” as it emerged in the twentieth century—a doctrinal realm 
shaped by statutes that legalized and gave administrative structure and 
legitimacy to conduct that previously had been governed solely by criminal 
law. 
A. Pre-NLRA: Union as Conspiracy 
The U.S. legal system emerged from a political tradition that was 
outwardly hostile to the practice of worker organizing.36 In the eighteenth 
century, English common law explicitly criminalized unionization and 
forbade workers from collectively acting in an effort to gain higher wages 
or to affect the conditions of their employment.37 Christopher Tomlins has 
identified the English legal hostility to worker organizing as a part of a 
broader fear of the link between “conspiracy and challenge to royal 
authority.”38 As he argued, in the context of 1718’s “Proclamation Against 
Combinations of Woollen Weavers,” “‘[C]onspiracy’ was invoked as a 
charge against journeyman’s organizations because of their bare assertion 
of concerted regulatory authority unsanctioned by the Crown. It was, 
indeed, this ‘outlaw’ status that, even distinct from anything they actually 
did, enabled public authority to label journeymen’s groups ‘unlawful’ or 
‘lawless’ combinations.”39 Accordingly, in the eighteenth century, “the 
country saw a rapid . . . expansion in statutory condemnation of 
journeymen’s organizations . . . .”40 Not only did workers’ organizations 
attempt to extort employers for higher wages,41 but they also risked 
 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 591 (1984); John T. Nockleby, Two Theories of Competition in the Early 19th 
Century Labor Cases, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 452 (1994); James Gray Pope, How American Workers 
Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518 (2004); Edwin E. Witte, Early 
American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825 (1926). 
 36.  See generally Forkosch, supra note 35 (chronicling the criminal prosecution of organizing 
workers). 
 37.  See TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY, supra note 15, at 115. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 118; see also Levin, American Gangsters, supra note 15, at 118-20 (arguing for an 
expansive reading of conspiracy prosecutions as rooted in a fear of non-state social and political 
structures). 
 40.  TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY, supra note 15, at 118. 
 41.  Cf. ORTH, supra note 35, at 5 (“‘Combination’ first entered the statute book in 1721 as the 
legal name for labour organizations. Earlier statutes had labelled their precursors ‘conspiracies’ or 
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upsetting the basic institutions of English life. That is, workers’ 
organizations were viewed as threatening to both the Crown and existing 
market structure. As such, workers’ organizations were subject to the 
institutionalized violence of the criminal law. 
Along with many other elements of the English common law, this 
hostility to labor organizing crossed the Atlantic.42 In the first half of the 
nineteenth century, criminal conspiracy law emerged as the dominant 
paradigm through which to address workers’ collective action.43 During this 
period, at least twenty-three “labor combinations” were prosecuted in six 
states.44 Convicted workers were fined or incarcerated.45 
Workers acting in concert were found criminally liable under one of 
two theories.46 First, in some jurisdictions, unionization (or, perhaps, less 
anachronistically, workers collectively seeking higher wages or better 
working conditions) was illegal per se.47 That is, the collective nature of 
workers seeking to improve their worklives became a crime in and of itself. 
Such a theory, therefore, resonates strongly with Tomlins’s characterization 
of English law and with the concern about unionization as constituting a 
crime against the state, or perhaps democratic society.48 Non-state collective 
action raised the specter of alternate modes of social, economic, and 
political organization—modes that might threaten both the state and the 
formal economy.49 While this doctrine was famously renounced by the 
 
‘confederacies’. All the names were bad. Conspiracy, perhaps the worst of all, was predominantly used 
to describe the common-law crime that was coming to be recognized when a group agreed to injure an 
individual, but combination was bad enough.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 42.  See TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY, supra note 15, at 124-27. 
 43.  See id. at 189. 
 44.  Id. at 128. 
 45.  Id. at 179. 
 46.  See JOHN R. COMMONS & JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION 100-01 
(1916). 
 47.  See, e.g., Old Dominion Steam-Ship Co. v. McKenna, 30 F. 48, 50 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887) (“All 
combinations and associations designed to coerce workmen to become members of such combinations 
or associations, or to interfere with, obstruct, vex, or annoy them in working, or in obtaining work, 
because they are not members, or in order to induce them to become members . . . are pro tanto illegal 
combinations or associations . . . .”); People v. Cooper (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1836), reprinted in 4 A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 277, 311 (John R. Commons et al. eds., 
1910); Commonwealth v. Grinder (Pa. Rec’s Ct. 1836), reprinted in 4 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 335, 340 (John R. Commons et al. eds., 1910). 
 48.  See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. Additionally, in tracing the labor conspiracy 
doctrine’s transatlantic voyage, it is important to note the distinction between the political economies 
and governing structures of England and the United States. See TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY, 
supra note 15, at 124-27. That is, addressing collective action in civil society in the Early Republic 
necessarily implicated debates about the proper relationship between the state and civic associations, or, 
more broadly, between private and public. Cf. id. In a monarchic system, where state legitimacy was 
presumed and where Enlightenment values and democratic principles did not purport to shape all aspects 
of governance, decisions about how to reconcile state and union (as representative of public power and 
private power, respectively) were inherently less laden. See id.  
 49.  See Levin, American Gangsters, supra note 15, at 111-20. 
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Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in its 1842 decision, Commonwealth 
v. Hunt,50 the per se criminalization of unions would retain some legal force 
for decades.51 As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes noted in dissenting from 
the grant of an anti-picketing injunction in Vegelahn v. Gutner,52 fifty-four 
years after Hunt, “there is a notion, which latterly has been insisted on a 
good deal, that a combination of persons to do what any one of them 
lawfully might do by himself will make the otherwise lawful conduct 
unlawful.”53 
Alternatively, other jurisdictions reached (and criminalized) the same 
worker conduct by focusing on some threat—explicit or implicit, physical 
or economic—to the employer.54 This theory, the “labor conspiracy 
doctrine,” outlived the per se criminalization of union activity and retained 
its force into the early 1900s.55 Even if the focus were largely on the 
collective nature of the defendants’ conduct, liability only attached when a 
court or jury identified some threat or harm to an employer.56 Under this 
theory, the crime of conspiracy had a victim distinct from the state or some 
amorphous market-based society. Workers who organized or attempted to 
obtain concessions from their employers harmed their employers. In a zero-
sum employment dispute, the workers’ gains would be the employers’ 
losses, rendering any such action on the part of the workers extortionate. 
Under either theory, the labor conspiracy cases established criminal law as 
the space in which to address labor disputes.57 
Even in the wake of the nineteenth century’s labor conspiracy cases, 
judicial hostility to workers’ collective action continued to employ the 
rhetoric and methods of criminal law. Indeed, labor injunctions, which 
authorized the use of force to quell union activity, became a staple of the 
latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,58 shifting unions 
 
 50.  45 Mass. 111 (1842); see also TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY, supra note 15, at 199-
216; Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 922-23.   
 51.  See Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393, 427 (1922). 
 52.  44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896). 
 53.  Id. at 1081 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 54.  See, e.g., People v. Faulkner (N.Y. Ct. Oyer & Terminer 1836), reprinted in 4 A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 47, at 315. 
 55.  See, e.g., White, Economic Radicalism, supra note 18, at 667. 
 56.  See, e.g., Hunt, 45 Mass. at 121; People v. Cooper (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1836), reprinted in 4 
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 47, at 277; Commonwealth v. Grinder (Pa. Rec’s Ct. 1836), 
reprinted in 4 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 47, at 335. 
 57.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pullis (Pa. 1806), reprinted in 3 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 
supra note 47, at 59; People v. Cooper (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1836), reprinted in 4 A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 47, at 277; People v. Faulkner (N.Y. Ct. Oyer & Terminer 1836), reprinted in 4 A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 47, at 315; Commonwealth v. Grinder (Pa. Rec’s Ct. 1836), 
reprinted in 4 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 47, at 335. 
 58.  See Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, supra note 35, at 1151; White, 
Economic Radicalism, supra note 18, at 667-68.  
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into a status of “semi-outlawry.”59 While the injunctions resulted from tort 
suits and other claims rooted in private law, their enforcement often 
involved state violence in the form of police, or even military, involvement. 
That is, these suits were not explicitly criminal; they frequently implicated 
the infrastructure of state violence and the criminal justice system. 
Enforcement of the injunctions entailed violent interventions in labor 
disputes and quickly turned striking workers into criminals who were 
subject to arrest. 
Between 1890 and 1930, the injunction replaced the prosecution as the 
preferred mode of labor regulation, with courts issuing over 4,300.60 Second 
Circuit Judge Ralph Winter describes this moment of labor regulation as 
one in which ideologically motivated judges frequently interceded in labor 
disputes to aid employers: “Acting without legislative guides, federal 
judges were inclined to decide labor controversies according to their own 
predominantly conservative social and political views, and rendered 
decisions which were generally hostile to the union’s use of economic 
power.”61 Or, as Justice Holmes put it in his Vegelahn dissent: 
The true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and of social 
advantage, and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be attained merely by 
logic and general propositions of law which nobody disputes . . . . It is plain 
from the slightest consideration of practical affairs, or the most superficial 
reading of industrial history, that free competition means combination, and 
that the organization of the world, now going on so fast, means an ever-
increasing might and scope of combination. It seems to me futile to set our 
faces against this tendency. Whether beneficial on the whole, as I think it, 
or detrimental, it is inevitable, unless the fundamental axioms of society, 
and even the fundamental conditions of life, are to be changed.62 
In realist terms, these labor decisions were decisions about the 
distribution of economic power, and the judiciary had thrown in its lot with 
capital, rather than labor. 
Beyond the explicit charges of conspiracy, those engaged in 
organizing, picketing, or otherwise employing “economic weapons” against 
 
 59.  Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, supra note 35, at 1185. 
 60.  Id. at 1151. 
 61.  Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Comment, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Labor Law: The 
Contemporary Role of Norris-LaGuardia, 70 YALE L.J. 70, 71 (1960). Judge Winter’s observation, 
published in a student note in 1960, just over two decades before he took the bench, is remarkable for 
two reasons. First, he accurately assessed the regime of labor regulation by injunction that existed during 
the Classical Legal Thought era preceding the New Deal. Second, he strikingly acknowledged the role 
of political and social factors in shaping judicial decision-making. While such an observation is largely 
tangential to this Article, Judge Winter’s note stands as a reminder of: (1) the contemporary acceptance 
of at least some of legal realism’s tenets; and (2) the development of a consensus that at certain 
historical moments, courts’ decisions and legitimacy are properly imbedded in larger conversations 
about dominant political, social, or economic ideologies. 
 62.  Vegelahn v. Gutner, 44. N.E. 1077, 1080-81 (Mass. 1896). 
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their employers risked: conspiracy prosecutions, criminal penalties for the 
violation of labor injunctions obtained by employers, and prosecution under 
a range of generally applicable statutes.63 Indeed, Ahmed White has argued 
that “specialized security statutes, like the federal Espionage Act of 1917 
and the criminal syndicalism laws that about half the states began adopting 
that same year” were not only enforced for, but also enacted “for the 
purpose of routing radical unionists.”64 Additionally, the Sherman Antitrust 
Act,65 another non-labor-specific statute, provided criminal punishment 
(and injunctive relief) as a means of resolving labor disputes.66 
It is worth noting, though, that even the suits that were not explicitly 
criminal, namely the ubiquitous labor injunction cases rooted in tort law, 
carried with them the clear threat of state violence. While any legal or 
regulatory regime may operate in the shadow of state power, state violence 
in the union context has a long history. Even those legal injunctions—like 
the one at issue in Vegelahn—that were the result of purportedly “private” 
actions frequently carried with them the threat of police and even military 
involvement.67 Worker organizing was treated as a legal wrong—whether 
initially civil or criminal68—that might trigger state violence and the 
mechanisms of criminal enforcement. In short, by the early twentieth 
century, a complex and diffuse web of laws governed workers’ collective 
action, but the legal strands that bound the web implicated the state violence 
associated with criminal enforcement.69 
B. The NLRA: Towards a Regulatory Model 
In the 1930s, as the United States shifted away from the economic 
policies that had underpinned the Gilded Age, unions began to take on an 
unprecedented position of legal privilege. Passed in 1932, the Norris-
LaGuardia Act marked a legislative commitment to intervening—on behalf 
 
 63.  See Ahmed A. White, A Different Kind of Labor Law: Vagrancy Law and the Regulation of 
Harvest Labor, 1913-1924, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 667 (2004); White, Economic Radicalism, supra note 
18, at 667-68; White, Workers Disarmed, supra note 1, at 66. 
 64.  White, Workers Disarmed, supra note 1, at 66. 
 65.  Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 
(2012)). 
 66.  See, e.g., White, Economic Radicalism, supra note 18, at 667. 
 67.  See infra note 273.  
 68.  Cf. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts As Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 918 
(2010) (endorsing a theory of tort law as embodying moral judgments about wrongful conduct). 
 69.  In Part IV, I will return to the question of what makes regulation criminal rather than civil. 
Scholars and courts have struggled with this distinction, and this larger theoretical question falls outside 
the scope of this project.  For the time being, it is worth noting two key components of criminal 
regulation that I will focus on and that I view as central to the ongoing project of “criminal labor law”: 
(1) the imminence or possible imminence of state violence or arrest in the enforcement of a legal 
decision, and (2) a strong form of moral condemnation or social de-legitimation. 
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of unions—in the escalating labor disputes across the country.70 The Act 
barred federal courts from issuing “any restraining order or temporary or 
permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, 
except in strict conformity with the provisions of” the Act.71 This marked a 
stark departure from even the civil treatment of unions in many 
contemporary labor disputes.72 
Not only was the statute’s passage a victory for organized labor, but it 
also signaled a legislative inclination to create a distinct space for “labor 
law”—a legal regime designed specifically for addressing unions, labor-
management relations, and labor disputes.73 In this regard, the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, as a precursor to the NLRA, demonstrates a normalization 
and legitimation of unions; rather than interlopers in the labor market, 
organized groups of workers were legally recognized parties capable of 
engaging in disputes with employers without judicial interference or the 
threat of conspiracy prosecutions. 
Building on this principle, the Wagner Act took the next step towards 
welcoming unions into the U.S. labor market as equal players.74 The Act 
moved beyond simply preventing anti-union judges from resolving labor 
disputes via injunction and went so far as to guarantee workers the 
substantive “right[s] to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .”75 Further, the 
Statute defined a range of “unfair labor practices”76 and established a 
remedial scheme whereby the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) 
could act as a specialized arbiter of labor disputes and address any such 
alleged unfair practices.77 
 
 70.  See Levin, Blue-Collar Crime, supra note 15, at 587-88; Winter, supra note 61, at 71 (“The 
Norris-LaGuardia Act embodies policies designed to effect profound changes in the role of the federal 
government and federal institutions in the regulation of labor disputes.”). 
 71.  29 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 72.  See FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT, supra note 35, 
at 59-127 (chronicling the use of labor injunctions and the “semi outlawry” of unions in the early 
twentieth century). 
 73.  See Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, supra note 7, at 375 (“In 1935, the Seventy-third Congress of 
the United States established a rigorously centralized regime of labor law. With the [NLRA] Congress 
moved to encompass all of American labor policy within a single federal statute to be interpreted, 
administered and enforced by a single federal agency . . . . [T]here was to be a single legal channel: 
Neither other federal laws nor state or local legislation was to interfere with the dominance of the NLRA 
and its administrative agency, the National Labor Relations Board.”). 
 74.  See Richard Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988, 992 (1984) 
(“[T]he Wagner Act brought about a revolution in the American law of labor relations. . . . [and a] tilt 
towards unions . . . .”). 
 75.  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 76.  Id. § 158. 
 77.  Id. § 160. 
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No longer treated as criminal combinations inimical to the state, 
capitalism, and democracy, unions were now deeply imbedded in the legal 
architecture of the market and framed as necessary to compensate for “[t]he 
inequality of bargaining power between employees . . . and employers[.]”78 
Indeed, as Karl Klare and others have argued, the Act took an aggressively 
pro-union stance, not only recognizing unionization as a legitimate option 
for workers, but explicitly adopting a normative preference for organized 
labor.79 As the “findings and declaration of policy” section that 
accompanies the Act’s substantive provisions states: 
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to 
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, 
impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by 
removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by 
encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial 
disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working 
conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between 
employers and employees.80 
Certainly, the statutory scheme was not without its limitations, but it 
inscribed the union into the legal architecture of the U.S. labor market as a 
non-criminal force for positive, socially beneficial, worker empowerment.81 
Or so it seemed. 
 
 78.  Id. § 151; see also Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 
346 (1944) (stating that the NLRA grants “statutory approval to the philosophy of bargaining as worked 
out in the labor movement in the United States.”). 
 79.  See, e.g., JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 1-43 
(1983) (describing the promise or the NLRA and the ways in which courts undercut its effectiveness); 
Klare, supra note 5, at 265-70 (arguing that the NLRA “was perhaps the most radical piece of legislation 
ever enacted by the United States Congress,” as it embodied a radical vision of unions’ social and 
economic importance, and that this vision was undermined by conservative judicial opinions interpreting 
the Act’s scope). But cf. David M. Rabban, Book Review, Radical Assumptions About American Labor 
Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1984) (critiquing Atleson’s account of the Wagner Act’s radical agenda 
as revisionist history); Comment, The Radical Potential of the Wagner Act: The Duty to Bargain 
Collectively, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1392, 1426 (1981) (“Contrary to Klare’s argument, the Supreme Court 
was not confronted with a variety of reasonable alternative interpretations of section 8(5) [of the NLRA] 
from which it chose the nonradical collective bargaining model. Rather, from the time it was proposed 
and enacted, the Wagner Act embodied only reformist ideals, and between 1937 and 1941 the courts and 
the NLRB worked to interpret and implement the Act consistently with them.”). 
 80.  29 U.S.C. § 151; see also Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 154 (1947) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“From the beginning it was apparent that there were but two ways of giving 
real force and meaning to this Act without throwing all industry and labor into strife and litigation. One 
was to give decisiveness and integrity in borderline cases to collective bargaining.”) (citing J. I. Case 
Co. v. NLRB., 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 
342 (1944)). 
 81.  See Ahmed A. White, Mutiny, Shipboard Strikes, and the Supreme Court’s Subversion of New 
Deal Labor Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 275, 276 (2004) (“The Wagner Act was by no means 
fundamentally radical; it did not in any way portend the destruction of private property, wage labor, or 
capitalism. At the same time, the Wagner Act was a remarkably progressive legal document, consistent 
with a genuinely reformist vision of labor relations.”).  
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C. Post NLRA: Criminal Law’s Continued Relevance 
While the NLRA ostensibly enshrined labor rights and a pro-
unionization bent in the nation’s legal and social consciousness,82 the 
ensuing decades would prove more challenging for unions. Indeed, no 
sooner had the Wagner Act set forth a legislative commitment to collective 
bargaining and worker collective action than concerns began to surface and 
gain ground about unions as corrupt, undemocratic, and dangerously 
powerful.83 The statute had spoken in legal realist terms of equalizing the 
balance of power between worker and boss,84 but in the years that followed, 
union critics argued that the pendulum had swung too far. Strengthened by 
the NLRA, the booming wartime economy, and post-war economic trends, 
unions had become more powerful—too powerful in the eyes of some 
critics. Echoing the concerns that had given rise to the labor conspiracy 
doctrine and the earlier prosecutions, critics argued that this consolidation 
of power in the hands of organized labor: (1) threatened employers and 
industries that might be held captive or extorted, and (2) undermined 
workplace democracy and workers’ rights by holding workers in thrall to 
unaccountable labor leaders.85 
In response to these concerns, legislators sought to recalibrate the 
balance of power in the workplace. Passed in 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act86 
marked a retreat from the Wagner Act’s pro-union sentiments.87 The Taft-
Hartley Act, passed over President Truman’s veto,88 comprised a set of 
amendments to the NLRA. Specifically, the new Act (1) permitted states to 
pass “right to work laws,”89 (2) outlawed “closed shops,”90 and (3) protected 
 
 82.  See, e.g., ATLESON, supra note 79, at 1-43; Klare, supra note 5, at 265-70. 
 83.  See United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., 352 U.S. 567, 578 (1957). 
 84.  See 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
 85.  See, e.g., Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1959); Int’l Union United Auto., 352 
U.S. at 578; Michael H. Leroy & John H. Johnson IV, Death by Lethal Injunction: National Emergency 
Strikes Under the Taft-Hartley Act and the Moribund Right to Strike, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 63, 67 (2001); 
Abner J. Mikva, The Changing Role of the Wagner Act in the American Labor Movement, 38 STAN. L. 
REV. 1123, 1127 (1986). 
 86.  Part III.B addresses the Act, its justifications, and its applications at greater length. 
 87.  See HARRY S. TRUMAN, VETO OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY LABOR BILL, H.R. 3020, 80TH CONG. 
(1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C. CONG. SERV. 1851, 1852 (1947) (“Much has been made of the claim 
that the bill is intended simply to equalize the positions of labor and management . . . . Many of the 
provisions of the bill standing alone seem innocent but, considered in relation to each other, reveal a 
consistent pattern of inequality.”); Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations 
Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1947) (arguing that Taft-Hartley amendments “represent an 
abandonment of the policy of affirmatively encouraging the spread of collective bargaining . . . .”); 
Estlund, supra note 5, at 1533-35 (“The Taft-Hartley Act . . . represented a major setback for the labor 
movement.”). 
 88.  See NLRB v. Hendricks Cty. Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 184 (1981) 
(“Although President Truman vetoed the Taft-Hartley bill, the bill nevertheless became law when 
Congress successfully overrode the veto.”) (citations omitted). 
 89.  29 U.S.C. § 157. 
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the rights of workers not to join unions and granted workers remedies if 
unions violated these rights.91 While scholars have engaged in extended 
debate about just how radically pro-union the Wagner Act actually was, 
and, consequently, how much Taft-Hartley “de-radicalized” labor 
protections,92 there can be no question that the 1947 amendments changed 
the fundamental terms and dynamics of the statutory scheme. As the 
Supreme Court identified the doctrinal shift, “[i]t was the intent of Congress 
to impose upon unions the same restrictions which the Wagner Act imposed 
on employers with respect to violations of employee rights.”93 
Legislators worried that unions had grown—or might grow—too 
powerful. Therefore, workers might be concerned not only about coercion 
at the hands of employers, but also at the hands of organized labor. Whether 
this concern was accurate or overstated and whether powerful capital and 
powerful labor can be distinguished meaningfully are serious questions. 
Indeed, much of the debate, scholarship, and jurisprudence concerning 
unions over the course of the last half century could be reduced to some 
version of these questions.94 But their reach extends well beyond this 
Article’s scope and this Part’s role in setting the stage for the contemporary 
relationship between criminal law and labor law. 
For purposes of this Article, though, the LMRA bears emphasis 
because of its criminal provisions.95 After the Wagner Act’s establishment 
of a unified system of civilly governing the workplace, the Taft-Hartley Act 
backtracked. While the amendments left in place the essential structures and 
unitary scheme of the NLRA,96 they also created a chink in the legislative 
 
 90.  Id. § 158(a)(3). 
 91.  Id. § 164(b). 
 92.  See Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: 
Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2034-35 
(2009) (describing the contours of the debate).  
 93.  Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 738 (1961). 
 94.  See, e.g., David Abraham, Individual Autonomy and Collective Empowerment in Labor Law: 
Union Membership Resignations and Strikebreaking in the New Economy, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268 
(1988); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements Under the National Labor Relations Act: 
The Statute, the Constitution, and the Court’s Opinion in Beck, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 51 (1990); 
George Feldman, Unions, Solidarity, and Class: The Limits of Liberal Labor Law, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. 
& LAB. L. 187 (1994); Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
1358 (1982); Thomas C. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule: Unions, Associations, Our First 
Amendment Disclosure and the Problem of DeBartolo, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 149 (1990); Seth Kupferberg, 
Political Strikes, Labor Law, and Democratic Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 685 (1985); Lee M. Modjeska, The 
Supreme Court and the Duty of Fair Representation, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 2-3 (1991); 
Ronald Turner, Employment Discrimination, Labor and Employment Arbitration, and the Case Against 
Union Waiver of the Individual Worker’s Statutory Right to a Judicial Forum, 49 EMORY L.J. 135 
(2000). 
 95.  See infra Part III.B. 
 96.  See Estlund, supra note 5, at 1534-35 (“But the 1947 amendments worked largely by addition, 
not subtraction; they left the core provisions of the original New Deal text––and in particular the original 
employer unfair labor practices––essentially intact.”); Charles J. Morris, How the National Labor 
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armor that protected unions from the bad old days of the labor conspiracy 
doctrine. 
The newly enacted § 302(a), to which I will return in the next Part, 
provides that: 
It shall be unlawful for any employer or association of employers or any 
person who acts as a labor relations expert, adviser, or consultant to an 
employer or who acts in the interest of an employer to pay, lend, or deliver, 
or agree to pay, lend, or deliver, any money or other thing of value 
(1) to any representative of any of his employees who are employed in an 
industry affecting commerce; or 
(2) to any labor organization, or any officer or employee thereof, which 
represents, seeks to represent, or would admit to membership, any of 
the employees of such employer who are employed in an industry 
affecting commerce; or 
(3) to any employee or group or committee of employees of such employer 
employed in an industry affecting commerce in excess of their normal 
compensation for the purpose of causing such employee or group or 
committee directly or indirectly to influence any other employees in the 
exercise of the right to organize and bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing; or 
(4) to any officer or employee of a labor organization engaged in an 
industry affecting commerce with intent to influence him in respect to 
any of his actions, decisions, or duties as a representative of employees 
or as such officer or employee of such labor organization.97 
Further, subsection (d) makes any such violation a federal crime 
punishable by up to five years in prison.98 And, subsection (b) prevents 
unions from accepting “things of value” under similar terms.99 While § 302 
has often been applied to disputes involving retirement accounts, pensions, 
or other employee benefits,100 union opponents recently have sought to 
extend its reasoning to a broader class of cases.101 
Section 302 is certainly a far cry from the common-law condemnation 
of organizing workers as outlaws.102 And it would require a suspension of 
disbelief to argue that the prohibition of certain forms of contracting 
 
Relations Act Was Stolen and How It Can Be Recovered: Taft-Hartley Revisionism and the National 
Labor Relations Board’s Appointment Process, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 7 (2012). 
 97.  29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (2012). 
 98.  Id. § 186(d). 
 99.  Id. § 186(b). 
 100.  See Carolyn D. Gentile, “The Check Is in the Mail” – Mastering the Maze of Employer 
Contributions to ERISA Plans, 72 MARQ. L. REV. 349, 352 (1989); Donald T. Weckstein, The 
Problematic Provision and Protection of Health and Welfare Benefits for Retirees, 24 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 101, 105-08 (1987); Note, Protection of Beneficiaries Under Employee Benefit Plans, 58 COLUM. 
L. REV. 78, 95-98 (1958). 
 101.  See infra Part III.B. In United States v. Ryan, the Court explicitly rejected a narrow reading of 
the statute that would apply only to the problem of welfare fund theft. 350 U.S. 299, 305 (1956). 
 102.  See supra Part II.A. 
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amounts to the form of per se conspiracy law discussed above. But it is 
important to note that the—potentially broad and open-ended—terms of the 
statute re-inscribe criminal law into the regulation of organized labor.103 The 
NLRA had defined a new legal regime for worker organizing, and Taft-
Hartley ensured that criminal law would serve a role in the regulatory 
framework. As in the earlier historical moment, unions were imagined as 
potentially powerful. And with this new power, came the potential for 
corruption and criminality.104 
If this fear of organized labor’s power were not enough to cause public 
skepticism about labor law’s pro-union sympathies, it also commingled 
with two other prevalent fears: communism and organized crime. That is, 
the same moment that witnessed unions’ ascendency to greater social and 
political prominence also saw the rise of other, more publicly feared forms 
of collective action. Both communists and organized crime (most 
commonly identified in the form of the Mafia) operated as extra-social, or 
extra-democratic collectives.105 They possessed their own internal 
hierarchies, enforced their own internal rules, and obeyed their own internal 
forms of governance.106 Much like the workers’ combinations that had 
given rise to the English labor conspiracy doctrine, these post-war 
collectives raised the specter of a domestic threat to state hegemony.107 At 
once extra-legal and extra-social, they provided spaces that were ordered 
but also independent of state authority and public values or ideological 
commitments. 
In light of this long history of discomfort with non-state collective 
action, it is hardly surprising that communists, the mob, and unions would 
become conjoined in legal discourse and the public imagination.108 In the 
middle part of the twentieth century, public and legislative preoccupation 
 
 103.  Part III.B will address, at much greater length, § 302, its function in regulating unions, and its 
place in the contemporary criminal and quasi-criminal enforcement mechanisms that quietly shape labor 
disputes.  
 104.  For criminal applications of the statute, see, for example, United States v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 
299, 307 (1956) (finding union representative prosecutable for accepting cash payments from employer 
during bargaining); United States v. Douglas, 634 F.3d 852, 857 (6th Cir. 2011) (convicting union 
representatives for refusing to end a strike “unless the two unqualified relatives of Union members 
finally received journeyman jobs”); United States v. Inciso, 292 F.2d 374, 376 (7th Cir. 1961) 
(convicting union representative for receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars from employers). 
 105.  See Carl A. Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of 1954: A Proposed Legal-Political 
Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 173, 182-89 (1956) (arguing that communist groups should 
not receive First Amendment protections because they were internally undemocratic and defined by 
hierarchical and authoritarian beliefs). 
 106.  See id. at 183-84. 
 107.  See Levin, American Gangsters, supra note 15, at 138-45; Levin, Blue-Collar Crime, supra 
note 15, at 610-14.  
 108.  See generally GARY MINDA, BOYCOTT IN AMERICA: HOW IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY 
SHAPE THE LEGAL MIND (1999) (arguing that labor law doctrine was shaped by public imaginations of 
unions as inherently tied to violence).  
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frequently waffled between two alternate critiques: (1) unions had become 
repositories for communists and communist sympathizers who sought to 
implement and advance repressive, violent, and anti-democratic agendas;109 
and (2) unions had become repositories for the Mafia and gangsters who 
sought to implement and advance repressive, violent, and anti-democratic 
agendas.110 In fact, the power vacuum in union leadership created by the 
purge of those suspected of communist ties allowed for the expansion of 
organized crime’s reach in some unions.111 
James Jacobs has argued that organized labor’s demise in the United 
States can be traced directly to organized crime’s infiltration of union 
leadership positions.112 By controlling organized labor, Jacobs argued, the 
Mafia undermined the ability of workers to create, shape, and expand an 
egalitarian and vital U.S. labor movement.113 Through violence and 
corruption, the racketeers subdued worker democracy and transformed 
unions into institutions to be feared, rather than respected.114 The concerns 
about non-state action, identified above, become all the more pressing when 
they are coupled with both real and perceived instances of violent union 
leaders. As David Witwer argued, unions were haunted by the “shadow of 
the racketeer, a menacing depiction of organized labor’s power that 
antiunion forces invoked throughout the postwar era.”115 In the twentieth 
century, unions not only faced an uphill battle in order to escape their 
historical legal and social framing as “conspiracies”;116 they also faced the 
public perception that they were led either by treasonous communists or the 
murderous gangsters. 
Further, and critically for this Article, ties to communists and the Mafia 
naturally catapulted organized labor back into the ambit of criminal law. 
Even if some union opponents continued to view organized labor as un-
American, thuggish, or generally suspicious after the Wagner Act, Congress 
 
 109.  See HARRY S. TRUMAN, VETO OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY LABOR BILL, H.R. 3020, 80TH CONG. 
(1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C. CONG. SERV. 1851, 1853 (1947); JACOBS, supra note 14, at 257-58.  
 110.  See THADDEUS RUSSELL, OUT OF THE JUNGLE: JIMMY HOFFA AND THE REMAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 88-90 (2001) (describing the public perception of links between the 
Teamsters and the Mafia); DAVID WITWER, CORRUPTION AND REFORM IN THE TEAMSTERS UNION 236 
(2008) [hereinafter, WITWER, CORRUPTION AND REFORM] (“[U]nion corruption served as justification 
for a much more intrusive level of government intervention into union affairs.”); Eisenhower Insists on 
End of Blackmail Picket Lines, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 7, 1959, at 5 (quoting President Eisenhower as 
advocating for “a law to protect the American people from the gangsters, racketeers, and other corrupt 
elements who have invaded the labor-management field.”). 
 111.  See JACOBS, supra note 14, at 257-58. 
 112.  See id. at 257-61. 
 113.  See id.  
 114.  See id.  
 115.  DAVID WITWER, SHADOW OF THE RACKETEER: SCANDAL IN ORGANIZED LABOR 241 (2009) 
[hereinafter WITWER, SHADOW OF THE RACKETEER]. 
 116.  See supra Part II.A. 
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and the courts had offered their blessing to the project of organizing U.S. 
workers. The new labor law regime stood for the proposition that unions 
were not necessarily criminal enterprises, and they should not be regulated 
as such.117 But acceptance was generally not extended to communists, who 
were widely viewed as inherently criminal,118 or to gangsters, who were, by 
definition, criminal. When unions were imagined as the embodiment of 
workers’ self-determination and collective voice (as framed by the Wagner 
Act), they might certainly have been fallible, but they were not the province 
of criminals.119 But when imagined as rooted in the criminal underworld or 
treasonous sleeper cells, unions once again returned to the domain of 
criminal law.120 As law professor and union democracy advocate Michael 
Goldberg put it, “[t]he vast majority of American unions, of course, are 
untainted by corruption or organized crime. But a little racketeering can go 
a long way.”121 
The LMRA did not represent the full set of criminal prohibitions that 
unions faced or the exclusive vehicle by which a union or its members 
could be hauled into court on criminal charges. Section 504 of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”),122 for 
example, “[made] it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve 
as an officer or (except in clerical or custodial positions) as an employee of 
a labor union.”123 While the Supreme Court later struck down this section as 
an unlawful bill of attainder in United States v. Brown,124 the LMRDA’s 
passage and the judicial interpretation of its provisions speak to the 
continued concern that criminal law might be necessary to “protect the 
national economy” from the threat of over-zealous, or politically radical 
unions.125 
 
 117.  That is not to say that criminal law might not reach union members or leaders who had 
otherwise committed crimes. Rather, the organization and operation of unions, along with their 
interaction with management, were identified as the proper subjects of a specific set of non-criminal 
legal doctrines. See generally Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 151-169 (2012)) (setting forth a civil regulatory regime for organized labor). 
 118.  See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951); Gitlow v. New York, 268 
U.S. 652, 665-66 (1925). 
 119.  Cf. HARRY S. TRUMAN, VETO OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY LABOR BILL, H.R. 3020, 80TH CONG. 
(1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C. CONG. SERV. 1851, 1859 (1947) (“One of the major lessons of recent 
world history is that free and vital trade unions are a strong bulwark against the growth of totalitarian 
movements. We must, therefore, be everlastingly alert that in striking at union abuses we do not destroy 
the contribution which unions make to our democratic strength.”). 
 120.  See WITWER, SHADOW OF THE RACKETEER, supra note 115, at 241-53.  
 121.  Michael J. Goldberg, Cleaning Labor’s House: Institutional Reform Litigation in the Labor 
Movement, 1989 DUKE L.J. 903, 906 (1989) [hereinafter Goldberg, Cleaning Labor’s House] (footnote 
omitted). 
 122.  29 U.S.C. § 504 (2012). 
 123.  United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 438 (1965). 
 124.  See id. at 461. 
 125.  Id. at 438-39. 
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In addition to these criminal statutes, RICO became a powerful vehicle 
for the criminal regulation of labor. Passed as Title IX of the Organized 
Crime Control Act of 1970,126 RICO was designed to facilitate “the 
elimination of the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into 
legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce.”127 Although not 
exclusively targeted at organized labor,128 RICO became a weapon of 
choice in combatting the alleged abuses of racketeer-controlled unions.129 
As scholars and courts have noted, RICO, with its broad scope and long list 
of predicate acts, has been a boon to federal prosecutors seeking to identify 
a statutory hook to address alleged misconduct.130 Further, the collective 
focus of RICO made it a natural fit for attempts to discipline the collective-
action space of unions.131 “Whereas traditional conspiracy law focused on 
individuals who had agreed to engage in group crime, RICO struck directly 
 
 126.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1970). 
 127.  S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 76 (1969). To this end, the statute announced four new criminal 
offenses: (1) to “use or invest” money derived from statutorily defined “racketeering” behavior to affect 
interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a); (2) to use such money in the maintenance of an interstate 
enterprise, id. § 1962(b); (3) “to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such 
enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt,” id. § 
1962(c); and (4) to conspire to commit any of the acts outlined in the preceding three sections, id. § 
1962(d). 
 128.  But see S. REP NO. 91-617, at 78 (1969) (“Closely paralleling its takeover of legitimate 
businesses, organized crime has moved into legitimate unions. Control of labor supply through control 
of unions can prevent the unionization of some industries or can guarantee sweetheart contracts in 
others. It provides the opportunity for theft of union funds, extortion through the threat of economic 
pressure, and the profit to be gained from the manipulation of welfare and pension funds and insurance 
contracts. Trucking, construction, and waterfront entrepreneurs have been persuaded for labor peace to 
countenance gambling, loansharking and pilferage. As the takeover of organized crime cannot be 
tolerated in legitimate businesses, so, too, it cannot be tolerated here.”) (footnote omitted). 
 129.  See James B. Jacobs & Lauryn P. Gouldin, Cosa Nostra: The Final Chapter?, 25 CRIME & 
JUST. 129, 141 (1999); Levin, American Gangsters, supra note 15, at 159-62; Ehren Park Reynolds, 
Protecting the Waterfront: Prosecuting Mob-Tied Union Officials Under the Hobbs Act and RICO After 
Scheidler, 10 BOALT J. CRIM. L. 2, 68-69 (2005); Victoria G.T. Bassetti, Note, Weeding RICO Out of 
Garden Variety Labor Disputes, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 103, 104 (1992). 
 130.  See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248-49 (1989) (“Congress drafted RICO 
broadly enough to encompass a wide range of criminal activity, taking many different forms and likely 
to attract a broad array of perpetrators operating in many different ways.”); Michael Goldsmith, RICO 
and Enterprise Criminality: A Response to Gerard E. Lynch, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 774, 775 (1988) 
(“[RICO] was a weapon of such power that it has become the Justice Department’s mainstay against 
traditional racketeering and other types of complex crime.”); Frank D’Angelo, Note, Turf Wars: Street 
Gangs and the Outer Limits of RICO’s “Affecting Commerce” Requirement, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2075, 2076 (2008) (“Over the decades that followed, prosecutors, seeking to test just how liberally 
courts would construe the Act’s language, invoked RICO to charge members of a panoply of new and 
increasingly noneconomic criminal enterprises.”); Barry Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the 
Prosecutor’s Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 167-71 (1980). 
 131.  Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2012) (“‘[E]nterprise’ includes any individual, partnership, 
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact 
although not a legal entity[.]”) (emphasis added); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-81 (1981) 
(“There is no restriction upon the associations embraced by the definition: an enterprise includes any 
union or group of individuals associated in fact.”). 
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at the organizational structure that allowed conspiracies to succeed. Under 
RICO, the criminal enterprise replaces the individual as the cornerstone of 
each trial.”132 And, indeed, violations of other labor-related statutes could 
serve as predicate acts under RICO,133 rendering the statute a sort of 
“penalty enhancer” for garden-variety labor law violations.134 
Accordingly, U.S. Attorneys pursued a wide range of RICO 
prosecutions against those allegedly engaged in “labor racketeering.”135 In 
his exhaustive 1987 study of RICO prosecutions, Second Circuit Judge 
Gerard Lynch identified 29 of the 236 (twelve percent) reported RICO 
prosecutions as resting on a predicate act of “labor corruption.”136 As Judge 
Lynch observed, “[o]rganized criminal control of unions has long been a 
principal concern of law enforcement, business, and public interest groups, 
and RICO appears to have provided the government with the tools to make 
significant cases.”137 Therefore, while the next Part will address the wide-
ranging use of RICO’s civil provisions in disciplining union leaders run 
amok, RICO’s criminal reach clearly encompassed—and shaped—the 
structure of postwar union governance. 
None of this is to say that criminal law has operated as the primary 
regulatory paradigm for addressing worker organizing in recent decades. 
Indeed, as noted repeatedly, the NLRA—deficient or ossified as it may 
have become—remains the law on the books and the law that technically 
governs private-sector unions. Further, as noted at the outset of the Article, 
other, non-criminal statutory frameworks have come to greater prominence 
as vehicles for addressing problems of workplace governance.138 Similarly, 
for union opponents, these quasi-criminal suits are but one set of weapons 
in a broader legal arsenal. Other non-criminal vehicles such as tortious 
interference suits,139 right-to-work laws,140 and attacks on union dues 
 
 132.  Goldsmith, supra note 130, at 774. 
 133.  See, e.g., United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982) (LMRDA violation). 
 134.  Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 
661, 759 (1987) (“The importance of RICO as a penalty enhancer in these cases is evident from the fact 
that such Taft-Hartley violations were listed as predicate acts in more than half of the labor corruption 
cases in the sample [of RICO prosecutions].”). 
 135.  See, e.g., United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Reifler, 
446 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Cody, 722 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Sheeran, 699 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1983); United 
States v. Greenleaf, 692 F.2d 182 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289 (11th Cir. 
1982); United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 
1323 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 136.  Lynch, supra note 134, at 734, 758. 
 137.  Id. at 758-59. 
 138.  See supra notes 7, 9-13 and accompanying text. 
 139.  See Paul More, Protections Against Retaliatory Employer Lawsuits After BE&K Construction 
v. NLRB, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 205, 217-18 (2004); Stanley J. Brown & Alyse Bass, 
Corporate Campaigns: Employer Responses to Labor’s New Weapons, 6 LAB. LAW. 975, 980-81 
(1990). 
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arrangements141 have served as powerful vehicles for labor’s opponents. But 
the post-Wagner Act labor racketeering scandals—much like the nineteenth 
century prosecutions—left the labor movement with a black eye of 
continued criminality.142 
By providing a brief historical background of labor’s criminal 
regulation and of criminal law’s continued vitality in labor regulation up 
until the present, this Part has situated the recent quasi-criminal RICO and 
LMRA suits against a broader backdrop of an historically strong, socio-
legal tie between unions and criminality. Such an historicized framing 
indicates that these new suits should not be dismissed merely as aberrations, 
anomalies, or clearly misguided departures from the dominant labor law 
framework.143 Instead, these invocations of criminal liability exist in a much 
broader context of criminal regulation of labor markets and—as I will argue 
below—in a broader context of an eroding distinction between civil and 
criminal legal regulatory regimes.144 Certainly, other legal regimes may 
contain similar civil-criminal hybrid provisions, but the unique criminal 
history of labor law makes such a dynamic in this context particularly 
noteworthy. In furtherance of these twin aims, the next Part addresses the 
recent spate of quasi-criminal civil suits brought against unions under RICO 
and § 302 of the LMRA. 
III. 
PRIVATE PROSECUTIONS 
As argued in the prior Part, RICO prosecutions of labor leaders and 
civil suits brought by the government under RICO continue a longstanding 
tradition of regulating union activity through criminal or quasi-criminal 
mechanisms. However, those suits dealt with misfeasance that was 
specifically framed as occurring outside of the proper functioning of unions 
and union democracy. That is, organized crime “infiltration” or “control” of 
the Teamsters or other unions was understood to be a subversion of what 
was otherwise a socially and politically legitimate entity, and criminal law 
and the federal government were interceding in order to preserve the proper 
functioning of organized labor in the market.145 These cases did not purport 
 
 140.  See Michael M. Oswalt, Note, The Grand Bargain: Revitalizing Labor Through NLRA 
Reform and Radical Workplace Relations, 57 DUKE L.J. 691, 700-01 (2007). 
 141.  See, e.g., Knox v. SEIU, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012); see also Sachs, The Unbundled Union, supra 
note 12, at 184. 
 142.  See, e.g., WITWER, SHADOW OF THE RACKETEER, supra note 115; Levin, Blue-Collar Crime, 
supra note 15. 
 143.  See Levin, Blue-Collar Crime, supra note 15, at 606. 
 144.  See infra Parts III-IV. 
 145.  See James B. Jacobs & Ellen Peters, Labor Racketeering: The Mafia and the Unions, 30 
CRIME & JUST. 229, 230 n.1 (2003) (“It need hardly be added that focusing on labor racketeering as a 
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to involve a per se objection to unions as bargaining units or socio-political 
entities; rather, the cases’ stated purpose was to cleanse unions of 
corrupting influence.146 In this narrative, unions were not the problem; 
corrupt unions or corrupt union leaders were. Therefore, such prosecutions, 
while clearly essential to a broader discussion of criminal law’s continued 
relevance to organized labor, are not the focus of this Article or this Part. 
Instead, this Part addresses the recent spate of private, civil suits 
brought under federal criminal statutes—RICO and the LMRA, 
respectively. As I discuss, infra, these suits differ markedly from 
government initiated suits and prosecutions for several critical reasons. 
First, these suits cut to the heart of union activity rather than to the alleged 
corruption of unions by bad actors. The allegations central to the plaintiffs’ 
complaints are not that rogue leaders have abused their position in an 
attempt to pursue individual wealth or consolidate power; rather, the claims 
relate to the functioning of the union itself. The plaintiffs assert that the 
ways in which unions are doing business, their mechanisms of organizing, 
and their bargaining techniques are, in and of themselves, criminal. In this 
respect, such claims re-inscribe and reiterate the arguments that animated 
the nineteenth century and pre-NLRA conspiracy prosecutions. That is, 
employers are arguing that the organizing process and the way in which 
unions are bargaining with employers violate the moral and legal code(s) of 
the marketplace. 
Framed against this long history of criminal regulation of organized 
labor, this Part addresses the two varieties of quasi-criminal civil suits that 
have begun to appear on federal courts’ dockets in the past several decades: 
those brought under RICO, and those brought under § 302 of the LMRA. In 
addition to outlining each variety of suit, this Part addresses their shared 
flaws and the similar ways in which both serve to import (or preserve) 
criminal principles in the realm of labor law, while ostensibly operating on 
civil terms. By focusing on these dynamics, this Part draws a parallel to the 
civil-criminal hybrid realm of labor injunctions, discussed above147—the 
absence of criminal procedure and the formality of prosecution, coupled 
with the invocation of criminal law principles and the threat of state 
violence. 
 
crime problem is no more an indictment of the vast majority of union officials and members than 
focusing on corporate crime is an indictment of the vast majority of businessmen.”). 
 146.  See Levin, Blue-Collar Crime, supra note 15, at 617. 
 147.  See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text. 
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A. RICO 
Few statutes have enjoyed more critical attention than RICO, due to its 
expansive scope and almost boundless civil and criminal applications.148 As 
an extension of broader conspiracy law principles, the statute has been used 
as a vehicle to address alleged misfeasance by those engaged in some form 
of collective action.149  The civil RICO suits that this Part addresses, 
therefore, are but one data point in a broader constellation of the statute’s 
creative application to collective action. Indeed, even putting aside the 
criminal RICO prosecutions discussed above, two other categories of RICO 
suits have helped shape contemporary union governance: (1) civil suits 
brought by the government in an effort to depose allegedly corrupt union 
leadership,150 and (2) private civil suits brought by employers against 
unions for efforts to organize employees or engage in hard bargaining.151 
While this Part will return briefly to the first category in closing, the 
primary focus of this Part is on the second category of RICO suits—private 
 
 148.  See, e.g., Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 507 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Douglas 
L. Bandow, The Obscenity of Federal RICO Law, in THE RICO RACKET 33 (Gary L. McDowell ed., 
1989); Judah Best et al., The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: Hardly a Civil 
Statute, in RICO: EXPANDING USES IN CIVIL LITIGATION 3 (Arthur F. Mathews ed., 1984); Craig M. 
Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV. 837, 838 (1980); 
Antonio J. Califa, RICO Threatens Civil Liberties, 43 VAND. L. REV. 805, 806 (1990); Brian Nisbet, 
Comment, What Can RICO Not Do?: RICO and the Non-Economic Intrastate Enterprise that 
Perpetuates Only Non-Economic Racketeering Activity, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 509, 539 
(2009); Robert K. Rasmussen, Introductory Remarks and a Comment on Civil RICO’s Remedial 
Provisions, 43 VAND. L. REV. 623, 624 (1990); Catherine Reid, Note, Limiting Political Expression by 
Expanding Racketeering Laws: The Danger of Applying a Commercial Statute in the Political Realm, 20 
RUTGERS L.J. 201, 203 (1988); William Roquemore Taylor, Comment, Federalizing Street Crime: The 
Improper Broadening of RICO’s “Affecting Commerce” Requirement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 139, 140-42 
(2009). 
 149.  See Goldsmith, supra note 130, at 774. 
 150.  See, e.g., United States v. Local 560, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986); United States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile & Composition 
Roofers, 686 F. Supp. 1139, 1165 (E.D. Pa. 1988); United States v. Local 6A, Cement & Concrete 
Workers, 663 F. Supp. 192, 196-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). See generally Goldberg, Cleaning Labor’s House, 
supra note 121; Michael C. Liebman, Governmental Civil RICO Actions and Labor Unions: 
Reorganization and Innocent Persons, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 125 (1989).  
 151.  See cases cited supra note 26; see also Overnite Transp. Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 168 F. 
Supp. 2d 826, 833-35 (W.D. Tenn. 2001); Teamsters Local 372 v. Detroit Newspapers, 956 F. Supp. 
753, 761-62 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Bassetti, supra note 129, at 122; Brudney, Collateral Conflict, supra 
note 25, at 733-37; Charlotte Garden, Labor Values Are First Amendment Values: Why Union 
Comprehensive Campaigns Are Protected Speech, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2617, 2626 (2011) (“[E]ach [of 
the RICO suits] alleged that the defendants had committed extortion by threatening to continue the 
comprehensive campaign until the employer agreed to the union’s demands.”); Jennifer Gordon, Law, 
Lawyers, and Labor: The United Farm Workers’ Legal Strategy in the 1960s and 1970s and the Role of 
Law in Union Organizing Today, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 63 (2005) (“RICO has increasingly been 
used against unions carrying out comprehensive campaigns on the accusation that labor’s alliances with 
consumers and shareholders constitute blackmail and should subject the union to criminal 
prosecution.”); Levin, Blue-Collar Crime, supra note 15, at 619-24; Herbert R. Northrup & Charles H. 
Steen, Union “Corporate Campaigns” as Blackmail: The RICO Battle at Bayou Steel, 22 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 771, 773 (1999). 
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actions alleging that employers have been harmed by unions’ extortionate 
conduct. 
RICO explicitly provides a private right of action for “[a]ny person 
injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of” the statute.152 
To obtain relief, a plaintiff must show that she suffered harm due to the “(1) 
conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering 
activity.”153 Further, demonstrating a “‘pattern of racketeering activity’ 
requires [proof of] at least two [statutorily defined] ‘predicate acts’ in a ten-
year period.”154 
In the suits brought by employers, the actions that gave rise to the 
complaints were “comprehensive” or “corporate” campaigns initiated by 
unions.155 While “corporate campaigns cannot be defined by either a unique 
common goal or universal tactic,”156 scholars have traced use of the term to 
the late 1970s and the work of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile 
Workers Union.157 The D.C. Circuit has stated that “the term encompasses a 
wide and indefinite range of legal and potentially illegal tactics used by 
unions to exert pressure on an employer.”158 The D.C. Circuit identified 
such tactics as including “litigation, political appeals, requests that 
regulatory agencies investigate and pursue employer violations of state or 
federal law, and negative publicity campaigns aimed at reducing the 
employer’s goodwill with employees, investors, or the general public.”159 
As an expansive attack on an employer, these campaigns represent an 
aggressive and popular mechanism for unions seeking concessions from 
more powerful employers.160 
The central claim in RICO suits arising from such union strategies is 
that the comprehensive campaigns have crossed the line from legitimate 
bargaining tactics into the coercive or extortionate. Specifically, the 
employers’ complaints assert that the unions’ attempts to obtain 
 
 152.  18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012). The LMRA contains no such explicit authorization of a private 
right of action, raising an additional set of concerns in the context of the quasi-criminal litigation. See 
infra Part III.B.  
 153.  Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 (footnote omitted). 
 154.  Cintas Corp. v. UNITE HERE, 601 F. Supp. 2d 571, 577 (S.D.N.Y) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 
1961(5)), aff’d, 355 F. App’x 508 (2d Cir. 2009). The statute provides an extensive list of conduct 
constituting “predicate acts.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (listing “predicate acts”). 
 155.  This Article uses the terms “corporate campaign” and “comprehensive campaign” 
interchangeably. 
 156.  Paul Jarley & Cheryl L. Maranto, Union Corporate Campaigns: An Assessment, 43 INDUS. & 
LAB. REL. REV. 505, 506 (1990). 
 157.  See id. at 505-06; Brudney, Collateral Conflict, supra note 25, at 737-738. 
 158.  Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 103 F.3d 1007, 1014 n.9 
(D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  See Jarley & Maranto, supra note 156, at 506-13; Brudney, Collateral Conflict, supra note 
25, at 742-44 (describing an “archetypal comprehensive campaign”). 
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concessions from employers amount to conduct akin to blackmail or 
extortion as prohibited by the Hobbs Act (one of the predicate acts under 
RICO).161 Under the Hobbs Act 
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the 
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or 
extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical 
violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do 
anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.162 
Further, the Act defines “extortion” as “obtaining of property from 
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened 
force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.”163 Therefore, the 
theories of RICO liability—though not identical in each case—rely on an 
argument that the unions are interfering criminally with the employer’s 
property rights, related to the undisturbed functioning of the employer’s 
business. While theoretically similar to the tortious interference claims that 
have been preempted under the NLRA, these RICO suits assert claims that 
evoke criminal liability. 
In Cintas Corp. v. UNITE HERE,164 for instance, the corporate 
plaintiffs brought RICO claims against the union defendant, focusing 
particularly on the union’s maintenance of disparaging websites and 
attempts to generate negative publicity about the plaintiffs.165 There, the 
defendant unions sought to obtain a card check/neutrality agreement from 
the employer (Cintas) and hoped that these tactics would pressure Cintas to 
enter into such an agreement.166 In Wackenhut Corp. v. Service Employees 
International Union,167 the employer, Wackenhut, alleged that the Service 
Workers International Union (“SEIU”) had undertaken an “extortionate 
campaign” in an effort to “strong arm Wackenhut into signing labor 
agreements.”168 Similarly, in Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers Int’l Union,169 the union sought a card 
check/neutrality agreement and allegedly “smear[ed]” the company in the 
process.170 “Smithfield . . . identified three property interests which 
 
 161.  See, e.g.,  Cintas Corp. v. UNITE HERE, 601 F. Supp. 2d 571, 577 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 355 F. 
App’x 508 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 162.  18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012). 
 163.  Id. § 1951(b)(2). 
 164.  601 F. Supp. 2d. 571. 
 165.  Id. at 575-76. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  593 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
 168.  Id. at 1290. 
 169.  585 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. Va. 2008). 
 170.  Id. at 796. 
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allegedly were ‘wrongfully’ targeted by the Defendants through the 
Smithfield Campaign.”171 
While the suits have met with mixed success at the motion to dismiss 
or summary judgment stage, none have resulted in a holding that a union’s 
comprehensive campaign violated RICO and the Hobbs Act.172 To this end, 
scholars have argued that the RICO suits arising from corporate campaigns 
are inherently meritless, preempted by the NLRA, or violative of workers’ 
First Amendment rights.173 Not only do the plaintiffs allege that the conduct 
lacks the NLRA’s protection, they also assert that the union’s conduct lacks 
any lawful basis. 
The close nexus between these RICO suits and a general theoretical 
hostility to the union project finds significant purchase in Herbert R. 
Northrup and Charles H. Steen’s account of litigating Bayou Steel Corp. v. 
United Steelworkers of America.174 In describing their representation of 
Bayou Steel, the corporate plaintiff, Northrup and Steen explicitly argue 
that contemporary unions have overstepped their bounds and are therefore 
better governed by the quasi-criminal framework of RICO than by 
traditional labor law statutes:175 
It is axiomatic that a corporate campaign pits a union against an employer. 
Thus, it is tempting to look to labor law, which typically controls the 
allocation of rights and liabilities between employers and organized labor, 
for the applicable rules of conduct and corresponding sanctions . . . . 
Making the conceptual leap from the simple fact of a union-employer 
conflict to labor law and NLRB’s exclusive jurisdiction, however, is neither 
necessary nor is it particularly illuminating in the context of corporate 
campaigns. Labor unions are not specially privileged by federal labor law, 
or any other source of law, to commit murder, arson, robbery, fraud, 
blackmail, or a host of other possible offenses—even in pursuit of 
legitimate collective bargaining objectives—without facing the very same 
legal sanctions that apply to everyone else. Thus the idea that disputes 
concerning the lawfulness or unlawfulness of corporate campaign activity 
must be resolved within the purview of NLRB actually is not well-founded. 
Moreover, corporate campaigns are by definition comprised of 
nontraditional tactics directed toward objectives that cannot be attained 
using traditional means such as elections, collective bargaining, and 
withholding labor en masse. In other words, corporate campaigns are 
 
 171.  Id. at 797. 
 172.  Brudney, Collateral Conflict, supra note 25, at 756 (“The reported decisions in these cases 
tend to involve a union’s motion to dismiss RICO claims on various grounds; such motions succeed or 
fail at roughly comparable levels.”). 
 173.  See, e.g., Bassetti, supra note 129; Brudney, Collateral Conflict, supra note 25; Garden, 
supra note 151. 
 174.  No. Civ. A. 95-496-RRM, 1996 WL 76344 (D. Del. Jan. 11, 1996); Northrup & Steen, supra 
note 151. 
 175.  Northrup & Steen, supra note 151, at 795-97. 
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intended by unions to take their disputes with employers outside the 
traditional labor law model for one simple reason: from the unions’ 
perspective, the model embodied by labor law is inadequate for the unions’ 
purposes. Accordingly, it is valid and worthwhile to analyze the lawfulness 
of corporate campaign tactics under non-labor laws and particularly under 
RICO.176 
In this framing, the union’s attempts to obtain concessions become 
analogs to violent crime, not to hard bargaining, or even tortious 
interference. The move to creative, extra-NLRA union organizing tactics 
has triggered a similarly creative, extra-NLRA employer response—a return 
to a criminal model.177 
Indeed, particularly in cases that do not involve allegations of violence, 
the employers’ theory of liability comes perilously close to the labor 
conspiracy doctrine discussed above.178 Where the Wagner Act stands for 
the proposition that unions may use social and economic pressure to exact 
concessions from employers, Cintas, Smithfield, and the other RICO 
plaintiffs argue that such economic and social pressure are extortionate. 
Northrup and Steen conceded that “labor unions enjoy special privileges in 
our society,”179 but insisted: 
not to allow civil recovery under RICO for damages incurred as a 
consequence of union corporate campaigns would be tantamount to saying, 
as a matter of law, that labor unions, in addition to their special rights under 
federal labor law, also are specially privileged to commit organized 
blackmail in violation of state law to get contracts.180 
Certainly, unions’ rights are limited; the U.S. labor law regime never 
guaranteed workers free reign in pursuing their interests. Even under the 
most radical or revisionist reading of federal labor law statutes, the NLRA-
sanctioned arsenal of economic weapons available to unions does not 
include secondary boycotts, general strikes, and forms of violent conduct.181 
Nevertheless, the underlying “extortion,” which the employers allege, lies at 
the very heart of the legally-recognized function of unions. As Brudney 
noted in arguing that these RICO suits are meritless, “federal labor law 
legitimates and indeed protects what might in ordinary meaning terms be 
thought of as extortionate activity.”182 To allow relief on the theories 
advanced by the employers in these cases would be to return to a version of 
the labor conspiracy doctrine. Recognizing this expansive reading of 
 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text. 
 178.  See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. 
 179.  Northrup & Steen, supra note 151, at 845. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  See generally White, Workers Disarmed, supra note 1 (describing the ways in which liberal 
labor law has restricted the radical potential of organizing workers). 
 182.  Brudney, Collateral Conflict, supra note 25, at 774. 
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extortion would re-establish a theory of property rights primacy that views 
worker organizing as a criminal (or quasi-criminal) intrusion on the rights 
of employers.183 
In dismissing the employer’s complaint in Cintas, the court recognized 
the high ideological stakes of the claims and issued a stinging rebuke to the 
plaintiffs, concluding that “[t]he Complaint is not the ‘short and plain 
statement’ contemplated by Rule 8; it is a manifesto by a Fortune 500 
company that is more a public relations piece than a pleading.”184 Further, 
the court rejected the underlying Hobbs Act claims by observing that 
“Cintas does not have a right to operate free from any criticism, organized 
or otherwise.”185 The legal framework for regulating organized labor that 
the Wagner Act had inaugurated remained, at least in this case, as a barrier 
between organized labor and the nineteenth century criminal model. In 
calculating the correct balance between property rights, on the one hand, 
and associational rights on the other, the analytical paradigm remained 
rooted in a post-NLRA legal framework. 
However, decisions like Cintas, the RICO claims’ limited success, and 
the lack of judicial endorsement of the employers’ theory do not necessarily 
undermine the suits’ efficacy.186 Litigation is expensive, and having to 
defend against a suit in federal court raises the marginal cost to unions that 
might otherwise seek to organize shops or employ the sorts of aggressive 
tactics associated with corporate campaigns.187 These are suits initiated with 
massive complaints that necessarily require substantial resources to litigate. 
Also, as discussed below, the suits themselves, which cast unions as 
extortionate interlopers in an otherwise civil economy, represent a forceful 
 
 183.  See, e.g., Crump v. Commonwealth, 6 S.E. 620, 630 (Va. 1888) (“The acts alleged and proved 
in this case [relating to a boycott] are unlawful, and incompatible with the prosperity, peace, and 
civilization of the country; and, if they can be perpetrated, with impunity, by combinations of 
irresponsible cabals or cliques, there will be the end of government, and of society itself. Freedom, 
individual and associated, is the boon and the boasted policy and peculium of our country; but it is 
liberty regulated by law; and the motto of the law is: ‘Sic utere tuo, ut alienum non leadas.”‘); 
Commonwealth v. Moore (1827), reprinted in 4 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 47, at 99, 105 
(“Without turning to books, therefore, or detaining you by an elaborate exposition of the law on the 
subject of conspiracies, we assume at once, that ‘All confederacies wrongfully to prejudice another are 
misdemeanours at common law, whether the intention be to injure his person, his property, or his 
character.”‘). 
 184.  Cintas Corp. v. UNITE HERE, 601 F. Supp. 2d 571, 574 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 355 F. App’x 508 
(2d Cir. 2009). 
 185.  Id. at 578 (“[W]ithin the labor context, in seeking to exert social pressure on [plaintiff], the 
Union’s methods may be harassing, upsetting or coercive, but unless we are to depart from settled First 
Amendment principles, they are constitutionally protected.” (citing Metro. Opera Ass’n v. Local 100, 
Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps., 239 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 2001))); Beverly Hills Foodland v. United Food 
& Commercial Workers, Local 655, 39 F.3d 191, 197 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he prime directive in the 
Union [organizing] campaign, a boycott of [the target employer] is . . . constitutionally safeguarded,” as 
is the accompanying “activity of peaceful pamphleteering.”). 
 186.  See infra note 247 and accompanying text.  
 187.  See Levin, Blue-Collar Crime, supra note 15, at 623. 
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public relations counterweight to the negative press created by corporate 
campaigns. One litigation strategy guide for employers even endorses the 
pursuit of RICO charges targeting unions’ corporate campaigns by noting 
that employers can still win by losing: “unsuccessful litigation can serve as 
an effective countermeasure against a union corporate campaign. Defending 
against complex defamation and extortion lawsuits can be costly, but it can 
provide publicity of the company’s position regarding the union’s untrue 
harassing attacks.”188 That is, Cintas or other anti-union RICO plaintiffs 
may lose the specific legal battles, but they may not be losing the broader 
economic and public relations war. 
Thinking about these suits as a matter of private litigation strategy also 
adds to our understanding of their place within a broader criminal 
framework. Despite the underlying criminal theory that animates these 
claims, the enforcement mechanism remains purportedly private and reliant 
upon the employers as private attorneys general. In this respect, these suits 
fall victim to many of the same critiques leveled at such private or hybrid 
private/public enforcement regimes generally: (1) they empower parties that 
might not represent the public interest; (2) as a result, they may lead to 
over- or under- deterrence of undesirable conduct; and (3) they are insulated 
from the sorts of political accountability that (we hope) attaches to public 
regulators or prosecutors.189 That is, like qui tam suits or public theories of 
tort law, these suits ostensibly serve as private vehicles for advancing the 
public interest.190 However, by arming individuals with enforcement power, 
 
 188.  Ronald Flowers, Fighting Back Against Union Corporate Campaigns, WORKFORCE MGMT., 
(Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.workforce.com/articles/fighting-back-against-union-corporate-campaigns.  
 189.  See John C.P. Goldberg, Tort in Three Dimensions, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 321, 328 (2011) 
[hereinafter Goldberg, Tort in Three Dimensions] (“The conservative is deeply skeptical. Of the 
plaintiff-private attorney general he asks: ‘Who deputized you to commence these proceedings? What if 
we don’t want you to sue?’ In a similar vein he asks: ‘How is it that, in a democratic political system 
with elected and expert policymakers, judges and jurors possess the authority to run a shadow regulatory 
system that lacks clear rules of operation and is often at odds with the system that first-line regulators 
have sought to put in place?’”), id. at 335 (“If tort law merely gives occasion to ad hoc efforts at 
compensation and regulation fenced in by arbitrary limits, we cannot in good conscience hold it up as a 
model for others.”); John C. P. Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists (and the Rest of Us): Private Law in 
Disguise, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 3, 4 (2004) [hereinafter Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists] 
(“[T]he tort system is not well designed to function as a form of disaster relief for injury victims because 
of its high transaction costs and its tendency to produce feast-or-famine compensation. It is also not well 
equipped to provide public safety regulation because of, among other things, judges’ and jurors’ lack of 
agenda control, their limited access to information, and their relative lack of expertise and 
accountability. In this sense, I maintain, tort law is not defensible as public regulatory law.”). 
 190.  See Associated Indus. of N.Y. State v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as 
moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943) (holding that Congress may authorize “private Attorney Generals” whose 
“sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest”); Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing 
Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Law, 
34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 954-57 (1985); James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 498 (1997); Edward A. Fallone, Section 10(b) and the Vagaries of Federal 
Common Law: The Merits of Codifying the Private Cause of Action Under a Structuralist Approach, 
1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 75-76 (1997). 
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these suits allow for an “ad hoc” mechanism for resolving social 
problems.191 Generally dependent on the political motivation and financial 
resources of the plaintiffs or their attorneys, private suits and qui tam 
actions favor individual assignments of culpability or liability rather than 
broader systemic reform. 
As noted above, this dynamic is hardly unique to the labor context. 
Other statutory schemes (and even certain common law claims) allow for a 
private plaintiff to assert a cause of action on the same theory or set of facts 
that might give rise to criminal liability. However, even if we might find 
such enforcement mechanisms acceptable in some cases, these RICO suits 
seem to be a particularly problematic example. For instance, support for 
expansive tort liability is often justified from scholars on the left as a “‘a 
weapon of social progress’ . . . providing assistance to and an outlet for 
ordinary people who have suffered setbacks,”192 but this rationale loses its 
appeal when the power dynamic between litigants shifts. That is, when 
imagined as an area in which the otherwise powerless plaintiff can access 
the legal system as a means of obtaining some form of relief, perhaps we 
might view private suits or private enforcement as a (qualified) normative 
good.193 But what if the plaintiff is the powerful actor? Or, what if we are 
less certain that the RICO plaintiffs are serving the public good, as opposed 
to their own private financial benefit?194 
If these suits allow employers to impose added costs on unions, to 
deter organizing efforts, or to make it more difficult for workers to make 
independent decisions about unionization, we are left with what resembles 
the pre-NLRA labor injunction—a quasi qui tam proceeding in which the 
plaintiff purports to enforce the law on behalf of the state or the public 
good. If employers are advancing claims that actually contradict statements 
of public policy by revitalizing a pre-NLRA imagination of the employer’s 
right to do business free from union interference, it becomes difficult to 
view these suits as enforcing the law, rather than trying to reform it.195 
 
 191.  Goldberg, Tort in Three Dimensions, supra note 189, at 324.  
 192.  Id. at 326 (quoting Allen M. Linden, Tort Law as Ombudsman, 51 CAN. BAR REV. 155, 164 
(1973)).  
 193.  There may still be good reason to be skeptical about private enforcement, even if we find the 
distributional consequences appealing. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.  
 194.  Of course, the concept that underlies private enforcement mechanisms is that by aligning the 
private financial benefits with those of the “public,” lawmakers may incentivize litigants to act as private 
attorneys general. See Laura J. Kerrigan et. al., Project: The Decriminalization of Administrative Law 
Penalties: Civil Remedies, Alternatives, Policy, and Constitutional Implications, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 
367, 375 (1993) (“Private citizens who bring these actions reap the benefits of damages in the suits they 
win or settle out of court. It seems that everybody wins, except the defendant, of course.”). In the anti-
union RICO context, then, my concern remains that the private interests of the plaintiffs may not align 
clearly with “the public interest.”  
 195.  Cf. supra notes 184-185 and accompanying text (discussing the claim that an employer holds 
a property right to do business free from union interference).   
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Finally, while a discussion of public civil RICO suits (i.e., suits in 
which the government is the civil plaintiff) is largely outside of the scope of 
this Article,196 it is worth pausing for a moment to consider the way in 
which such suits might operate in tandem with the private RICO suits 
discussed above and the LMRA suits discussed below in Part III.B. These 
suits generally involve the state seeking to take control of an allegedly 
corrupt union, deposing the leaders, and replacing them with some sort of 
receivership or federal trustee relationship. While the state, in such suits, 
nominally intervenes on behalf of the workers in an effort to re-establish 
union democracy,197 it is important to recognize the limitations of such a 
project.198 Corrupt union officials may pose serious issues for the promise 
of worker self-determination or a democratic workplace,199 but replacing 
one set of union leaders with a new, state-sanctioned alternative does not 
guarantee worker democracy. Rather, it represents a belief that the state can 
(and should) impose a specific view of what organized labor should look 
like.200 As in the earlier moment of labor conspiracy prosecutions focused 
on curbing threats to the government’s monopoly on violence,201 state 
involvement in union governance appears geared towards subduing a 
threatening non-state collective. That is, by effectively “taking over” 
unions, U.S. Attorneys may ameliorate internal corruption, but such an 
intervention may carry with it significant normative views about what union 
governance should look like, or how unions should behave. The 
government interests that replace those of corrupt leaders may be more 
aligned with rank-and-file workers; but they may not.202 
The Wagner Act, like any form of regulation, necessarily carries with it 
some normative objective. However, the Wagner Act was a statute, a 
 
 196.  See cases cited supra note 150. 
 197.  See JACOBS, supra note 14, at 138-60; Goldberg, Cleaning Labor’s House, supra note 121, at 
950-55. 
 198.  See Levin, American Gangsters, supra note 15, at 160-62; see also Eric J. Pritchard, 
Comment, RICO and Labor Corruption: The Propriety of Court-Imposed Trusteeships, 62 TEMP. L. 
REV. 977, 978 (1989) (“Critics, however, argue that the appointment of a government trustee to control 
the affairs of a corrupt union deprives members of their federally guaranteed right to control their union 
and its affairs . . . .”). 
 199.  See generally KENNETH C. CROWE, COLLISION: HOW THE RANK AND FILE TOOK BACK THE 
TEAMSTERS (1993) (discussing corruption within the Teamsters); JACOBS & COOPERMAN, supra note 14 
(same); JACOBS, supra note 14, at 138-60 (same); Goldberg, Cleaning Labor’s House, supra note 121; 
Michael J. Goldberg, In the Cause of Union Democracy, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 759, 763 (2008). 
 200.  See Levin, American Gangsters, supra note 15, at 161-62 (“[Government control of unions] 
may prove an effective means of reducing organized crime and may indeed serve the interests of worker 
democracy in unions overrun by oppressive and violent syndicates. But when we consider the fact that 
more radical, leftist union leaders had been deposed decades earlier . . . based on similar claims that they 
were antidemocratic or failed to represent worker interests, there seems to be good reason to think that 
RICO might weed out politically disfavored or marginalized union leaders and unionization regimes, in 
addition to those that actually failed to represent worker interests.”) (footnote omitted). 
 201.  See TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY, supra note 15, at 118. 
 202.  See Levin, American Gangsters, supra note 15, at 160-62.  
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product of legislative compromise, and a general legal framework. These 
RICO suits—even if public rather than private—are, instead, case-by-case 
affairs.203  Certainly, the NLRB also deals with individual cases. But it does 
so through the general framework of labor law. RICO, however, exists 
outside of the compromises, goals, and structures of labor law. State actors 
intervene in union affairs not because of “unfair labor practices” as defined 
by the NLRA, but because of allegations of corruption or racketeering. In 
so doing, they replicate the individualized dynamics and optics of a 
criminal prosecution, rather than the broader, non-exclusive dynamics of a 
purely civil regulatory regime. With this tension in mind, the next Section 
proceeds to address private suits under the LMRA, which similarly take 
root in stated concerns about unions as hotbeds of corruption. 
B. LMRA 
Just over a decade after the NLRA affirmed a national commitment to 
the unionization program, “Congress enacted the LMRA . . . to curb abuses 
‘inimical to the integrity of the collective bargaining process.’”204 Given 
that § 302 of the LMRA applies only to labor disputes, it has been the 
subject of much less judicial and scholarly examination and criticism than 
RICO;205 however, it has recently come into the judicial spotlight due to the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355.206 
Mulhall involved a challenge to a neutrality agreement by Martin 
Mulhall, a greyhound racetrack employee whose employer, Mardi Gras 
Gaming (“Mardi Gras”) had entered into such a neutrality agreement with 
the union UNITE HERE (“Unite”).207 In the agreement, Mardi Gras 
promised to (1) provide union representatives access to non-public work 
premises to organize employees during non-work hours; (2) provide the 
union a list of employees, their job classifications, departments, and 
addresses; and (3) remain neutral to the unionization of employees.208 In 
 
 203.  Cf. supra note 189 and accompanying text (describing the potential issues raised by private 
enforcement of statutes in the public interest). 
 204.  Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 355, 667 F.3d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 
S. Ct. 2849 (2013), and cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 822 (2013), and cert. dismissed as improvidently 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 594 (2013) (quoting Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 425 (1959)). 
 205.  But see Comment, Payments to Joint Labor-Management Boards Under LMRA Section 302, 
10 STAN. L. REV. 374 (1958) (describing issues posed by payments to joint labor-management boards); 
Christopher J. Garofalo, Note, Section 302 of the LMRA: Make Way for the Employer-Paid Union 
Representative, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 775 (2000) (examining the LMRA’s application to employer-paid 
union representatives). 
 206.  667 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 207.  See id. at 1213. 
 208.  Id. 
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return, Unite promised to lend financial support to a ballot initiative 
regarding casino gaming.209 
Neutrality agreements, a product of declining union power and 
stagnating labor law over the past several decades,210 involve an employer’s 
promise not to oppose unionization actively prior to employees’ vote on 
whether to join a union.211 In exchange for the employer’s cooperation, the 
union makes preemptive concessions that if the workers vote to unionize, 
the union will refrain from striking, boycotting, or engaging in other hostile 
actions.212 
Such agreements are clearly imperfect. On the one hand, supporters of 
organized labor and critics on the left have argued that these agreements 
deprive workers of a say in their own governance, creating a top-down 
union model, failing rank-and-file members, and doing more to advance 
union power or to guarantee a cooperative workforce for employers than to 
level the playing field between workers and bosses.213 On the other hand, 
union opponents and critics on the right have characterized neutrality 
agreements as sweetheart deals, providing unions with an unfair advantage 
and lining the pockets of union officials, while leaving anti-union workers 
and their rights out of the equation.214 
Warts and all, though, these agreements have become a staple of the 
contemporary union’s playbook.215 But are they criminal? Does a union’s 
promise amount to “a thing of value” under the LMRA?216 
 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 13, at 1591 (“The story of neutrality agreements begins with 
unions’ frustrations in trying to counteract the decline in union density in the latter half of the twentieth 
century.”); Hartley, supra note 13, at 372.  
 211.  See Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 369 (4th Cir. 2008); Hotel Emps. & Rest. 
Emps. Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hosp. Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206, 219 (3d Cir. 2004); Brudney, supra, 
note 13, at 825; Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 13, at 695, 697-98.  
 212.  See Mulhall, 667 F.3d at 1213; Adcock, 550 F.3d at 371. As such agreements are contractual 
in nature, their terms necessarily vary from case to case. That is, the specific concessions on the part of 
the union or what form an employer’s neutrality might take is not uniform across organizing campaigns.  
 213.  See, e.g., Richard W. Hurd, Neutrality Agreements: Innovative, Controversial, and Labor’s 
Hope for the Future, 17 NEW LAB. F.,  Spring 2008, at 35-41. 
 214.  See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 13, at 841-62; Sean Higgins, High Court to Review Sweetheart 
Deals Between Unions, Management, WASH. EXAMINER (July 2, 2013), 
http://washingtonexaminer.com/high-court-to-review-sweetheart-deals-between-unions-
management/article/2532570 (“The Supreme Court will now determine whose interest the collective 
bargaining process is meant to promote: the workers’ or the union’s.”). 
 215.  See Cooper, supra note 13, at 1591. 
 216.  It is certainly possible that a neutrality agreement could also involve a monetary payment that 
would clearly amount to a “thing of value.” Indeed, granting Mulhall a generous reading, the Eleventh 
Circuit had concluded that the political support could be monetized easily, rendering it clearly analogous 
to a quid pro quo cash payment. See Mulhall, 667 F.3d at 1215-16. However, the general theory 
underlying Mulhall and the other § 302 suits cuts more broadly and focuses on the nature of the 
neutrality agreement itself, with an emphasis on speech rights rather than cash. See Benjamin Sachs, 
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Represented by attorneys from the National Right to Work Legal 
Defense Foundation, Mulhall asserted just such a claim. Bringing suit under 
§ 302, he alleged that the neutrality agreement violated the statute, because 
his employer and Unite had agreed to exchange “a thing of value.” After the 
District Court dismissed Mulhall’s complaint, holding that Unite’s 
assistance in supporting the ballot initiative was not “a thing of value,” the 
Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that a jury could find that a thing of 
value had indeed been exchanged.217 
The decision sparked outrage among union supporters and intense 
speculation among labor law scholars and practitioners.218 If the Supreme 
Court upheld the decision, would all neutrality agreements be barred?219 
How would unions be able to compete with employers successfully in the 
battle for workers’ hearts and minds? 
After hearing argument on the case, in December 2013, the Supreme 
Court ended almost two years of speculation in what “could [have been] the 
most significant labor law case in a generation”220 with a one-sentence 
order: “The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.”221 
However, Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor dissented. Among other 
objections to the Court’s order, Justice Breyer stated that “I believe we 
should also ask for further briefing on a third question: the question whether 
§ 302 authorizes a private right of action.”222 Leaving the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision undisturbed and failing to address this question would “raise[] the 
 
Another Reaction to the Mulhall Argument, ONLABOR (Nov. 13, 2013), 
http://onlabor.org/2013/11/13/another-reaction-to-the-mulhall-argument/.  
 217.  See Mulhall, 667 F.3d at 1213. 
 218.  See, e.g., T. Ward Frampton, Neutrality Agreements and Article III Standing: Why UNITE 
HERE Local 355 v. Mulhall is Nonjusticiable (Oct. 7, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2336677; Jack Goldsmith, The Two Central Issues 
in Mulhall, ONLABOR (Aug. 19, 2013), http://onlabor.org/2013/08/19/the-two-central-issues-in-mulhall-
2/; Josh Eidelson, Scalia’s Chance to Smash Unions: The Huge Under-the-Radar Case, SALON (Nov. 
13, 2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/11/13/scalias_chance_to_smash_unions_the_huge_under_ 
the_radar_case/. 
 219.  But cf. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, UNITE HERE Local 355 v. Mulhall, 
134 S. Ct. 594 (2013) (Nos. 12-99 and 12-312), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/Mulhall.Invitation1.pdf (“Only three circuits have considered whether an 
employer’s compliance with a voluntary recognition agreement is a ‘payment, loan, or delivery’ of a 
‘thing of value’ in violation of Section 302. All three of those courts recognized that employers and 
unions may voluntarily agree to set ground rules for union organizing campaigns without violating 
Section 302.”). The Third Circuit had earlier rejected a reading of § 302 analogous to Mulhall’s by 
concluding that the employer was “unable to provide any legal support for the remarkable assertion that 
entering into a valid labor agreement governing recognition of a labor union amounts to illegal labor 
bribery.” Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hosp. Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206, 219 (3d 
Cir. 2004). 
 220.  Benjamin Sachs, The Court and the Future of Unions: Private Sector Edition, ONLABOR 
(Aug. 9, 2013), http://onlabor.org/2013/08/09/the-court-and-the-future-of-unions-private-sector-edition/.  
 221.  UNITE HERE Local 355 v. Mulhall, 134 S. Ct. 594, 594 (2013). 
 222.  Id. at 595. 
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specter that an employer or union official could be found guilty of a crime 
that carries a 5-year maximum sentence . . . if the employer or union 
official is found to have made certain commonplace organizing assistance 
agreements with the intent to ‘corrupt’ or ‘extort.’”223 That is, unions might 
have much bigger worries than their organizing strength, like prison. 
While Mulhall is the latest § 302 suit to capture the labor community’s 
attention, it is not unique. Over the same period of time that the anti-union 
civil RICO suits have begun to emerge as a possible means for employers to 
combat corporate campaigns,224 § 302 suits challenging neutrality 
agreements also began to appear in federal courts across the country.225 
Unlike the RICO suits, however, Mulhall was initiated by workers, rather 
than employers.226 The theory articulated by Mulhall in his complaint was 
reflective of this general class of cases: the employer and the union, by 
agreeing to some set of terms prior to an NLRB-certified election, had 
unlawfully exchanged “a thing of value.” 
Indeed, it is this underlying concern that a union and employer may 
conspire to benefit at the expense of their employees that has been 
articulated as the rationale underlying § 302. In Arroyo v. United States,227 
the Supreme Court undertook an analysis of the statute’s legislative history, 
stating that: 
When Congress enacted [§ 302] its purpose was . . . to deal with problems 
peculiar to collective bargaining. The provision was enacted as part of a 
comprehensive revision of federal labor policy in the light of experience 
acquired during the years following passage of the Wagner Act, and was 
aimed at practices which Congress considered inimical to the integrity of 
the collective bargaining process. Throughout the debates in the Seventy-
ninth and Eightieth Congresses there was not the slightest indication that [§ 
302] was intended to duplicate state criminal laws. Those members of 
Congress who supported the amendment were concerned with corruption of 
collective bargaining through bribery of employee representatives by 
employers, with extortion by employee representatives, and with the 
possible abuse by union officers of the power which they might achieve if 
welfare funds were left to their sole control. Congressional attention was 
focused particularly upon the latter problem because of the demands which 
had then recently been made by a large international union for the 
 
 223.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 224.  See supra Part III.A. 
 225.  See, e.g., Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2008); Hotel Emps. & Rest. 
Emps. Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hosp. Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2004); Patterson v. Heartland 
Indus. Partners, 428 F. Supp. 2d 714 (N.D. Ohio 2006); Complaint at 1, Burton v. Auto Workers, No. 
1:14-cv-76 (E.D. Tenn. dismissed May 28, 2014). 
 226.  See Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 355, 667 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 
133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013), and cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 822 (2013), and cert. dismissed as improvidently 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 594 (2013). 
 227.  359 U.S. 419 (1959). 
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establishment of a welfare fund to be financed by employers’ contributions 
and administered exclusively by union officials.228 
Thus, where the victim in the RICO narrative is consistently the 
employer that has been harmed by an aggressive organizing campaign,229 in 
the LMRA context, the victim is the worker. 
According to the logic of these § 302 suits, the allegedly corrupt 
dealings between union and employer have served to enrich both parties’ 
interests at the expense of the workers. The employer has betrayed its 
employees by stacking the deck in favor of unionization,230 and the union 
has (preemptively) betrayed the worker by agreeing to forego a subset of 
bargaining techniques and signaling its general willingness to cooperate 
with the employer.231 For purposes of this Article, this dynamic is 
particularly significant for two reasons: (1) its contribution to the framing of 
unions as criminally corrupt and doing criminal harm to individual workers, 
and (2) its basis as a grounding for the implied private rights of action 
claimed in the § 302 suits. 
First, the identification of worker as victim is critical to such claims as 
de-legitimating the union as both a legal and a social entity. By invoking 
the language and legal violence of criminal law, a private suit under § 302 
allows for a holding that a union is criminally harming specific workers. In 
this way § 302, like RICO, can—at least in some circumstances—harken 
back to the criminal roots of labor regulation discussed in Part II. By 
situating the nature of the wrong as criminal and culpable because of harm 
to specific victims, such suits operate outside of a legal and rhetorical 
framework that includes unions as a legitimate, non-criminal component of 
labor markets. 
The proliferation of so-called “right-to-work” statutes232 and the 
articulation of scholarly and political criticism of unions as inefficient or 
 
 228.  Id. at 424-26 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted); see also Sage Hosp., 
390 F.3d at 219 (“In short, section 302 ‘was passed to address bribery, extortion and other corrupt 
practices conducted in secret.’” (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Int’l Union, United Auto., 107 F.3d 1052, 
1057 (3d Cir. 1997))); Turner v. Local Union No. 302, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219, 1227 
(9th Cir. 1979) (“The dominant purpose of § 302 is to prevent employers from tampering with the 
loyalty of union officials and to prevent union officials from extorting tribute from employers.”). 
 229.  In this way, the RICO cases serve as a powerful analog to the cases applying the labor 
conspiracy doctrine. See supra Part II.A.  
 230.  See Brudney, supra note 13, at 841-62. 
 231.  See Hurd, supra note 213, at 41-42. 
 232.  These laws bar “union security agreements”––agreements between unions and employers that 
allow unions to collect dues from employees as a condition of their employment. See, e.g., Craig Becker, 
The Pattern of Union Decline, Economic and Political Consequences, and the Puzzle of a Legislative 
Response, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1637, 1645-46 (2014); Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt & Winston Lin, The 
Great Recession, the Resulting Budget Shortfalls, the 2010 Elections and the Attack on Public Sector 
Collective Bargaining in the United States, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 407, 428 (2012); Oswalt, 
supra note 140, at 698-702. Right-to-work laws have been criticized as creating “free rider” problems, 
as these statutes (combined with the requirements of federal labor law) may require a union to represent 
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flawed from a distributional standpoint,233 for instance, demonstrate a 
hostility to, or at least skepticism about, unionization in certain quarters. 
However, such anti-union arguments and anti-union laws clearly sound in 
the register of economic efficiency and distributional fairness. These are 
legal and political arguments predicated on normative views about how the 
market should be structured or should operate, based either on descriptive 
or imagined accounts of what unions do.234 While these economically 
grounded critiques may be informed by background assumptions about 
unions as corrupt, tied to criminality, or perhaps even rooted in a history of 
violence or thuggery,235 the arguments themselves, and the right-to-work 
statutes that they have spawned, do not sound in criminal law. Instead, they 
are explicitly civil, grounded in the sorts of discourse about efficiency and 
the proper structuring of firms and markets that are generally associated 
with tort law or other civil or administrative realms.236 
 
employees who may in turn refuse to pay dues for this service. See, e.g., Matthew Dimick, Labor Law, 
New Governance, and the Ghent System, 90 N.C. L. REV. 319, 355 (2012); Raymond Hogler & Steven 
Shulman, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Right to Work: Colorado’s Labor Peace Act and Its 
Implications for Public Policy, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 871, 930 (1999).  
 233.  See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL 
STATEMENT 228-47 (1980); Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the 
New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1365-67, 1382 (1983); Keith N. Hylton, Efficiency and 
Labor Law, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 471, 471 (1993) (“[U]nions are seen as economically inefficient––in the 
sense that society would be wealthier without them––because cartel behavior generally is viewed by 
economists as inefficient.”).  
 234.  As Raymond Hogler and Steven Shulman contend in their economic analysis of right-to-work 
statutes, “[e]conomists tend to be either pro-union or anti-union depending upon their sympathy with the 
goals of the labor movement, their adherence to the ideal of a free labor market, and their reading of the 
literature on the effects of unions.” Hogler & Shulman, supra note 232, at 922. 
 235.  See Levin, Blue-Collar Crime, supra note 15, at 629-31; MINDA, supra note 108, at 142-45; 
WITWER, SHADOW OF THE RACKETEER, supra note 115, at 9-13; Jonathan H. Adler, Is “Right to Work” 
Libertarian?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.volokh.com/2012/12/12/is-right-to-
work-libertarian/ (“I’m not a particular fan of unions as they’ve manifested themselves in the U.S. 
(Exposure to union thuggery and violence as a child will do that to a chap).”). 
 236.  This is not to say, of course, that economic analysis and discussions of market efficiency are 
unknown to criminal law and criminal legal scholarship. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, 
The Economics of the Law of Criminal Attempts, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 299 (1996); Darren Bush, Law and 
Economics of Restorative Justice: Why Restorative Justice Cannot and Should Not Be Solely About 
Restoration, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 439 (2003); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the 
Criminal Law As a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1 (1990); Geraldine Szott Moohr, 
Defining Overcriminalization Through Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Example of Criminal Copyright 
Laws, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 783, 785 (2005); Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. 
REV. 741 (1993); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
1193, 1195 (1985). Indeed, economic analysis of law may be one of the contributing factors to the 
theoretical breakdown of the criminal-civil distinction discussed infra. See Steiker, supra note 33, at 780 
(“The theoretical distinction between remedial and retributive justice, never unproblematic, has become 
increasingly unstable in light of the ascendence [sic] of economic analysis of law, which strives for a 
single model of optimal sanctioning that transcends old categories . . . . Economic analysis of law, which 
has focussed [sic] on the common deterrent purpose of the criminal and civil sanctions, has correlated 
with the expansion of ‘hybrid’ sanctioning authority in the administrative state.”). Further, this is not to 
say that economic analysis is politically pure or devoid of moral judgments or political inflection. 
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In contrast, suits under § 302 take labor disputes and disputes about 
unionization’s normative desirability out of the realm of ostensibly 
dispassionate economic analysis, and re-imbed discussions of unions’ 
possible shortcomings in terms of corruption, moral culpability, and 
criminal harm. John Coffee articulates this morality-based view of the civil-
criminal distinction: 
the factor that most distinguishes the criminal law is its operation as a 
system of moral education and socialization. The criminal law is obeyed not 
simply because there is a legal threat underlying it, but because the public 
perceives its norms to be legitimate and deserving of compliance. Far more 
than tort law, the criminal law is a system for public communication of 
values.237 
Viewed through such a lens, the moral condemnatory function of 
stating a claim under a criminal theory (and a criminal statute) transforms 
what might otherwise be a claim about contractual rights and remedies into 
an evocation of shared values and an attempt to identify unions and 
employers that cooperate with unions as somehow deviant.238 
Granted, some scholars may explain the decision to treat such allegedly 
corrupt dealings as criminal under § 302 in economic terms as rooted 
simply in an attempt to obtain optimal deterrence against unions and 
employers conspiring against employees’ interests.239 Similarly, we might 
view tort law as embodying a morally condemnatory approach—that is, a 
 
Indeed, much of this Article seeks to break down the clear distinctions between the pure moral discourse 
often employed by deontological scholars of the criminal law and the pure economic discourse of those 
who study labor markets. Rather, as I argue in Part IV.A infra, in the context of the civil-criminal 
distinction, it is to say that criminal law and its condemnatory function play a special role in explicitly 
structuring social discourse and public discussions of morality. By importing the rhetorical and 
institutional dimensions of criminal law into arguments about the proper structure of the labor market, I 
argue, we risk confusing debates about efficiency with those about morality, and vice versa. 
 237.  John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing 
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 193-94 (1991). 
 238.  See DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 
67-68 (1990) (“[Criminal punishment] is more than an instrument of crime control. It is also a sign that 
the authorities are in control, that crime is an aberration and that the conventions which govern social 
life retain their force and vitality”), id. at 67 (“[T]he rituals of criminal justice . . . are ceremonies which, 
through the manipulation of emotion prompt particular value commitments on the part of the 
participants and the audience and thus act as a kind of sentimental education, generating and 
regenerating a particular mentality and particular sensibility”); Ely Aharonson, “Pro-Minority” 
Criminalization and the Transformation of Visions of Citizenship in Contemporary Liberal 
Democracies: A Critique, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 286, 291 (2010) (describing a “dominant view that 
perceives criminal law as a medium through which societies construct collective values and forge social 
solidarities”); Benjamin Levin, Inmates for Rent, Sovereignty for Sale: The Global Prison Market, 23 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 509, 527-29 (2014). 
 239.  See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 
169 (1968) (constructing a model to determine optimal rates of punishment and enforcement); cf. 
Coffee, supra note 237, at 194-95 (critiquing an economic analysis of criminal law as “pricing” rather 
than “prohibiting” misconduct). 
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tort may be civil, but it is a wrong.240 Justifications for tortious interference 
claims or the civil suits that formed the basis of the pre-NLRA labor 
injunctions may well have rested not only in efficiency rationales, but also 
in a conception of the morality of the marketplace. 
However, to view the use of criminal statutes in the labor context as 
noteworthy is not to embrace a specific view of tort law’s justifications. 
Rather, as long as we believe that there must be some meaningful 
distinction between criminal laws and civil ones, the decision to proscribe 
conduct via a criminal statute, rather than a civil one requires further 
inspection. Criminal law has unique costs, and a turn to criminal statutes 
should require a weighing of those costs against any benefits. While the 
next Part will return to these larger questions of the civil-criminal 
distinction and the costs of proceeding under criminal paradigms, I will 
cabin this theoretical inquiry momentarily. Instead, this Part next turns to 
the second critical aspect of the § 302 litigation: the (implied) private right 
of action. 
As Justice Breyer’s Mulhall dissent emphasizes, the actual viability of 
any private rights of action under § 302 remains a live question. In urging 
the Court to ask for additional briefing, rather than dismiss the case, Justice 
Breyer 
recognize[d] that the Court said, long ago and in passing, that § 302(e) 
“permit[s] private litigants to obtain injunctions” for violations of § 302. 
But, in light of the Court’s more restrictive views on private rights of action 
in recent decades, the legal status of Sinclair Refining’s dictum is uncertain. 
And if § 302 in fact does not provide a right of action to private parties like 
Mulhall, then courts will not need to reach difficult questions about the 
scope of § 302, as happened in this case, unless the Federal Government 
decides to prosecute such cases rather than limit its attention to cases that 
clearly fall within the statute’s core antibribery purpose.241 
Even if § 302 actually does not provide a basis for suits like Mulhall’s 
the statute might well continue to serve as a weapon against unionization, as 
long as the federal government does not prosecute under the theory 
advanced by Mulhall (i.e., a neutrality agreement may constitute a “thing of 
value”). 
 
 240.  See, e.g., JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW: 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 3 (3d ed. 2012); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort 
Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1123 (2007) (“On its face, tort law is a law of wrongs. 
The word ‘tort’ means wrong. Before tort was identified as a legal category in its own right, torts were 
known as ‘private wrongs.’”) (footnotes omitted); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse 
in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (1998).  
 241.  UNITE HERE Local 355 v. Mulhall, 134 S. Ct. 594, 595 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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While Justice Breyer’s dissent asked whether § 302 implies a private 
right of action, this Article does not purport to provide an answer.242 
Instead, my focus here is on the issues inherent in attempting to regulate 
labor disputes, or determine the normative desirability of neutrality 
agreements, via a criminal statute. Indeed, the legitimate statutory authority 
for these claims may be less important in the immediate future than their 
continued use.243 Much like the pre-NLRA labor injunctions244 and the 
private civil RICO suits,245 discussed above, the very filing of a suit may 
accomplish many of the plaintiff’s goals. Forcing a union to defend against 
the claim in and of itself may be a victory for opponents of organizing.246 
Litigation is costly, and being able to frame a union’s conduct in criminal 
terms serves a valuable public relations purpose, by conjuring up the 
“shadow of the racketeer.”247 
Further, the worker-victim dynamic of the § 302 suits frames unions as 
directly harmful to workers. Where a private RICO complaint might serve 
as an employer’s “public relations piece,”248 inciting general hostility to 
unionization, Mulhall’s complaint put three specific groups on notice:249 (1) 
unions are alerted that neutrality agreements may include additional 
financial and reputational costs associated with litigating such claims; (2) 
employers are alerted that, by entering into neutrality agreements, they risk 
being guilty of conspiring with unions against their employees; and (3) 
 
 242.  Resolving this question would not only involve an analysis of the LMRA’s legislative history, 
but also an inquiry into how the Court’s general attitude toward private rights of action has evolved in 
the fifty plus years since Sinclair Refining v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962). See generally Jack 
Goldsmith, Three Problems in Mulhall, ONLABOR (Aug. 21, 2013), http://onlabor.org/2013/08/21/three-
problems-in-mulhall/; Jack Goldsmith, Further Thoughts on the Implications of the Mulhall Dismissal, 
ONLABOR (Dec. 11, 2013), http://onlabor.org/2013/12/11/further-thoughts-on-the-implications-of-the-
mulhall-dismissal/.  
 243.  That being said, a judicial or legislative determination that § 302: (1) did not confer a private 
right of action; (2) did not apply to neutrality agreements; and (3) was not the proper vehicle for 
pursuing the issues raised in these suits, would certainly go a long way towards curtailing continued 
litigation and the collateral consequences of the suits described infra. Cf. Brudney, Collateral Conflict, 
supra note 25, at 794-95 (arguing that curtailing anti-union civil RICO suits would be a good first step 
towards broader labor law reform). Put simply, there is a clear difference between: (1) bringing suit 
under a novel or controversial theory; and (2) continuing to file claims, after receiving an explicit 
judicial or legislative mandate foreclosing relief, as a means of burdening a defendant. The former may 
work and may lead to the desired precedent; the latter may lead to sanctions or countersuit under anti-
SLAPP legislation. Cf. More, supra note 139, at 216 n.44 (discussing the application of anti-SLAPP 
laws to frivolous anti-union claims). 
 244.  See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text. 
 245.  See supra Part III.A. 
 246.  See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 247.  See generally WITWER, SHADOW OF THE RACKETEER, supra note 115 (discussing the cultural 
framing of union leaders as criminal). 
 248.  Cintas Corp. v. UNITE HERE, 601 F. Supp. 2d 571, 574 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 355 F. App’x 508 
(2d Cir. 2009). 
 249.  Of course, the LMRA suits also may serve the same general purpose of inciting public and 
voter hostility towards unions identified in the RICO context. See supra Part III.A. 
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workers are alerted that unions are engaged in possibly criminal activities 
that demonstrate that union leadership is more focused on amassing wealth 
and power than serving workers’ interests. These characterizations of the 
signaling effects of § 302 litigation may suffer from over reliance on 
generalizations, but the key issue remains: the suits themselves re-cast 
organizing efforts and frame unions and workers as parties at odds. 
Substantively, re-casting the neutrality agreement as a “thing of value” 
performs a similar legal and rhetorical function as the RICO suits’ 
characterizations of “extortionate” conduct.250 Unions are once again 
framed as corrupt, violating the morality of the marketplace. While the 
allegedly unlawful conduct and the concessions sought by unions in the 
RICO suits clearly go to the heart of the union’s role as an economic unit 
(at times) oppositional to employers,251 the conduct at issue in the § 302 
suits is less essential to the functions identified in the NLRA.252 Indeed, as 
discussed above, the neutrality agreement is a relatively recent development 
in labor-management relations.253 Nevertheless, the arguments raised in the 
§ 302 suits would transform a “thing of value” from a tangible, or monetary 
benefit, which unions, employers, and courts could clearly identify, to an 
intangible bundle of speech rights. As noted above, there may be good 
reasons for those concerned about workers’ rights to oppose neutrality 
agreements, but is framing them as tantamount to monetary bribes—and, 
therefore, criminal conduct—the best way to stop the practice? Given the 
history of criminalizing workers’ speech and associational rights outlined in 
Part II, I argue that it would be a mistake to embrace such a nebulous (and 
criminal) definition of what amounts to bribery in the union context.254 
Much like the RICO suits that allege a criminal violation as their 
predicate act,255 the § 302 suits are premised upon an allegation that a felony 
has occurred.256 If the terms of a neutrality agreement constitute a “thing of 
value,” then both union and employer have violated § 302(a) and therefore 
are subject to the penalties outlined in § 302(d). Or, more precisely, an 
 
 250.  See supra Part III.A. 
 251.  See, e.g., Brudney, Collateral Conflict, supra note 25, at 774 (“[I]t is important to recognize 
that federal labor law legitimates and indeed protects what might in ordinary meaning terms be thought 
of as extortionate activity.”). 
 252.  But see Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hosp. Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206, 
219 (3d Cir. 2004) (concluding that the employer was “unable to provide any legal support for the 
remarkable assertion that entering into a valid labor agreement governing recognition of a labor union 
amounts to illegal labor bribery”).  
 253.  See supra notes 211-213 and accompanying text. 
 254.  See Sage Hosp., 390 F.3d at 219. 
 255.  See supra Part III.A. 
 256.  See UNITE HERE Local 355 v. Mulhall, 134 S. Ct. 594, 595 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Benjamin Sachs, Has the Employer in Mulhall Confessed to a Felony?, ONLABOR, (Sept. 23, 2013), 
http://onlabor.org/2013/09/23/has-the-employer-in-mulhall-confessed-to-a-felony/.  
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employer and a union might be subject to the penalties if a U.S. Attorney’s 
office were to decide to prosecute. 
As of the writing of this Article, a federal prosecutor has yet to 
advance the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation’s theory 
that a neutrality agreement might violate § 302.257 No criminal charging 
document identified a neutrality agreement as a predicate “thing of value.” 
Therefore, what is essentially a theory of criminal liability has remained 
confined to civil litigation. Indeed, Adcock v. Freightliner LLC,258 and Hotel 
Employees & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality 
Resources, LLC,259 the only appellate decisions other than Mulhall to 
address this broad reading of § 302, make no mention of the statute’s 
criminal provisions or the potential for criminal liability that could stem 
from the plaintiffs’ theory.260 
Further, in Mulhall, Hollywood Greyhound Track, Mulhall’s employer, 
explicitly argued in its brief before the Supreme Court that the neutrality 
agreement was a “thing of value.”261 “In no uncertain terms, then,” observed 
Benjamin Sachs, “the employer is arguing to the Supreme Court of the 
United States that it—the employer—has violated a federal criminal statute 
and has committed a felony.”262 This confession might be dismissed as one 
of the many “strange things” about Mulhall,263 but it also demonstrates the 
troubling phenomenon that this Article hopes to highlight: the employer 
effectively disregarded the criminal nature of the statute. In an effort to 
undercut a union’s organizing tactic, the employer (like Mulhall, himself) 
turned to the easiest tool in sight—a criminal statute. But in crafting its 
argument, the employer explicitly conceded that it (and many other 
employers in similar situations) had committed a felony. As it defies 
credulity that this was an oversight on the part of the employer and its 
attorneys, I argue that we should ascribe this confession to a belief that no 
 
 257.  But cf. cases cited supra note 104 (collecting cases in which union officials were prosecuted 
under § 302 for receiving monetary gifts). 
 258.  550 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2008).  
 259.  390 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 260.  But see Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 375 n.3 (4th Cir. 2008). In a single 
footnote, the Fourth Circuit alluded to the statute’s criminal nature by stating that “we need not decide 
the extent to which intangible items may have value under § 302 or any other criminal statute 
prohibiting the delivery, conveyance, or acceptance of a ‘thing of value.’” Id. However, this passing 
reference marks the court’s only acknowledgement that it is interpreting a criminal statute. 
 261.  The first section of the brief’s argument bears the title: “A Contractual Agreement in Which a 
Union Requests and Receives Employer Commitments Not to Oppose Unionization, Access to 
Employees and Facilities, Voluntary Recognition on the Basis of Authorization Cards and Interest 
Arbitration Concerning Employment Terms is a ‘Thing of Value.’” Brief for Respondent at 10, UNITE 
HERE Local 355 v. Martin Mulhall, 134 S. Ct. 594 (2013) (Nos. 12-99, 12-312). 
 262.  Sachs, supra note 256. 
 263.  See id. As commentators noted, the case was riddled with possible procedural and 
jurisdictional defects and peculiarities that ultimately may have led to the Supreme Court’s decision to 
dismiss. See, e.g., Eidelson, supra note 218; Frampton, supra note 218; Goldsmith, supra note 242. 
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prosecution would follow. That is, while criminal in name and form, for 
practical purposes, § 302(d) has receded from view, rendering § 302(a) a 
civil, injunctive provision.264 
While this dynamic of civil and criminal liability premised on identical 
facts or theories is hardly unique to the anti-union suits discussed in this 
Article,265 the dynamic raises issues peculiar to the labor law context. 
Principally, the specific history of labor law’s relationship to criminal law 
makes the identification of union or worker conduct as criminal or as 
essentially criminal resonate with the deep-seated cultural narrative that 
underpinned pre-NLRA U.S. labor regulation.266 By invoking the specter of 
criminal liability, the § 302 plaintiffs emphasize the dimensions of labor 
law that continue to exist outside of the confines of NLRB proceedings. 
Victory for the plaintiffs in these cases would amount to declaratory relief 
in the form of a judgment that a union had more likeley than not committed 
a felony, and the union’s activity must therefore be enjoined. 
These suits stand as a clear analog to the labor injunctions that formed 
“labor law” in the moment preceding unionization’s formal, statutory 
authorization in the 1930s.267 As the Third Circuit concluded in rejecting a § 
302 claim lodged against a neutrality agreement in Sage Hospitality, “[the 
employer’s] interpretation of section 302 would wreak havoc on the 
carefully balanced structure of the laws governing recognition of and 
bargaining with unions.”268 Indeed, given that “[a] violation of § 302 is one 
of the enumerated predicate racketeering activities in the RICO statute,”269 
the two statutes would combine to recast labor disputes as the proper 
province for the sort of criminal and injunctive action discussed in Parts II 
A and B, supra. 
With this doctrinal overview of § 302 and the civil RICO suits as a 
background, the next Part steps back to consider the significance of a 
potential return to “criminal labor law.” What do these suits and their place 
 
 264.  Part IV delves more deeply into the potential significance of criminal law without 
punishment. 
 265.  See, e.g., United States v. Van Engel, 809 F. Supp. 1360, 1371 (E.D. Wis. 1992), rev’d, 15 
F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting a statement by G. Robert Blakey, “the father of the federal RICO 
statute,” that “[s]ettlements, not only of RICO claims, but also of anti-trust and securities matters always 
involve the settlement of issues that raise at least a possibility of a parallel criminal prosecution”); Linda 
S. Eads, Separating Crime from Punishment: The Constitutional Implications of United States v. Halper, 
68 WASH. U. L.Q. 929, 983-87 (1990) (discussing the dynamics of parallel civil and criminal 
investigations); Carol E. Longest, Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 855, 
855, n.1 (1987) (identifying statutory bases for parallel proceeding in: “15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3, 15, 15a (1982) 
(antitrust); I.R.C. § 7201 (1982) (tax); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(d) (1982) (securities)”). 
 266.  See supra Part II.A. 
 267.  See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text. 
 268.  Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hosp. Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206, 219 (3d 
Cir. 2004). 
 269.  Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 373 n.2 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 
1961(1)(c)). 
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in U.S. labor history tell us about unions’ place in our current socio-legal 
moment? And, what might a criminal (or quasi-criminal) turn in regulating 
unions tell us about the role of criminal law in structuring markets? 
IV. 
THE CRIMINAL TURN IN CIVIL REGULATION 
Until this point, this Article has focused primarily on the regulation of 
unions and has treated criminal law as a frame, or lens through which to 
address the legal structuring of the labor market. This Part takes a broader 
view and addresses the tension between “civil” and “criminal” legal 
regimes that underlies the long history of “criminal labor law.” Certainly, 
evaluating the consequences of the civil-criminal distinction overall would 
be a massive undertaking and would greatly exceed the scope of this 
Article.270 Instead, this Part treats labor law as a case study, a space in 
which we can examine the vitality (or obsolescence) of the distinction and 
the consequences of criminal law’s ubiquity. Indeed, thinking about 
“criminal labor law” should not only illuminate the institutional decisions 
undergirding labor law; rather, labor law and its entanglement with criminal 
doctrine may provide a valuable frame through which to consider broader 
questions about dynamic trade-offs between criminal and civil regulation. 
Labor law’s unique civil-criminal history, therefore, serves as an 
underexplored angle of entry and inquiry into contemporary debates about 
the proper scope of criminal law and the causes and consequences of 
overcriminalization. As examined at length in Part II, labor law stands as an 
unusual doctrinal realm that has fluctuated between civil and criminal 
regulatory models. The law of criminal conspiracy comprised traditional 
Anglo-American “labor law,”271 so the default rules against which the 
NLRA and subsequent labor law doctrines have operated were those that set 
up a paradigm of outlawry. In this way, labor law becomes an interesting 
illustration of criminalization, de-criminalization, and the political economy 
of each regulatory move. Further, the potential for a return to criminal law 
in regulating organized labor raises the question of whether the criminal 
model can (or should) be abandoned following a decriminalization project. 
To address these issues, this Part first examines the exceptional 
qualities of “criminal labor law,” specifically its historical roots. Next, I 
argue that the potential application of criminal statutes in the union context 
illustrates a broader set of pathologies in U.S. criminal law. 
 
 270.  See Coffee, supra note 237, at 202 (“Short of a doctrinal treatise or a major empirical study, 
no article could hope to demonstrate the degree to which the criminal law has encroached upon formerly 
‘civil’ areas of the law.”). 
 271.  See TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY, supra note 15, at 189. 
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A. Criminal Labor Law As Exceptional 
As an historical matter, much about the recent attempts by union 
opponents to resuscitate criminalization of worker organizing feels like déjà 
vu. Faced with a legal system that had rejected the outright criminalization 
of unionization, union opponents seek to invoke the state violence and de-
legitimating force of criminal law. This reprisal of the pre-NLRA 
injunctive/criminal regulatory regime warrants a look back at the critiques 
of that period. Returning to the substantial scholarly criticism of this earlier 
moment of “labor regulation by injunction,”272 the same issues emerge. 
Instead of the specialized dispute resolution mechanisms of the 
NLRB,273 the injunction or quasi-criminal system relies on private plaintiffs 
and on courts acting, frequently in an interlocutory fashion. But, as in the 
pre-NLRA era, the issue is not simply that private attorneys general might 
serve as regulators274 or that Article III judges are the ones levying 
decisions. Rather, it is the invocation of state violence or the potential for 
force implicated by the criminal law. As noted above, the labor injunctions 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries often involved 
enforcement by police, military, or some form of explicit use or threat of 
official force.275 Similarly, the current re-deployment of criminal principles 
by private actors implicates at least the threat of state violence. Even if 
largely ignored,276 the threat of prosecution hangs, like the Sword of 
Damocles, over these proceedings. 
Thinking back to Judge Winter’s characterization of the highly 
politicized nature of the pre-Norris-LaGuardia labor injunctions,277 it is 
 
 272.  See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text. 
 273.  This is not to say that the NLRB or “labor law” proceedings are immune from these criticisms 
and are somehow divorced from politics or the same concerns about politicization that infect private 
suits and judicial oversight of labor disputes. Indeed, scholars have frequently leveled such criticisms at 
the NLRB and its jurisprudence. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s 
Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 221, 221-23 (2005); Joan Flynn, “Expertness for 
What?”: The Gould Years at the NLRB and the Irrepressible Myth of the “Independent” Agency, 52 
ADMIN. L. REV. 465, 545 (2000); Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the 
Aging of the National Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569, 571 (2007); Brian J. 
Woldow, Note, The NLRB’s (Slowly) Developing Beck Jurisprudence: Defending A Right in A 
Politicized Agency, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1075, 1087-88 (2000). 
 274.  See J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1140-41 (2012). 
 275.  See supra note 58 and accompanying text; see also Forbath, The Shaping of the American 
Labor Movement, supra note 35, at 1186-87 (“[I]njunctions were invoked by employers, police, and the 
press to justify measures like arming strikebreakers or jailing pickets.”); White, Workers Disarmed, 
supra note 1, at 69, 72, 75; Ahmed A. White, Industrial Terrorism and the Unmaking of New Deal 
Labor Law, 11 NEV. L.J. 561, 573, 576-77 (2011). 
 276.  See supra notes 261-264 and accompanying text. 
 277.  See supra note 61 and accompanying text.  
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important to recognize the contingency of the current suits.278 Certainly, 
from a realist perspective, adjudication in any legal area cannot be divorced 
from its political context.279 But, here, the law-politics nexus becomes 
particularly noteworthy and inescapable. First, labor litigation is deeply 
imbedded in a long history of highly fraught political disputes about the 
desirability and function of unions.280 Second, the presence of private 
litigants operating not only as attorneys general, but also potentially as 
some sort of private prosecutors, suggests an implementation of criminal 
law principles and criminal law’s social-structuring effect, without the 
public accountability formally associated with the criminal justice system. 
Further, in light of this latter dynamic, the state’s decision to (or not to) 
prosecute, after obtaining what amounts to an indictment via civil suit,281 
signals a political decision about: (1) the normative desirability of unions; 
and (2) the normative desirability of neutrality agreements. 
Ultimately, then, the civil-criminal distinction in these suits may come 
down to a politically inflected decision about whether a prosecution follows 
a plaintiff’s successful determination. Indeed, it is important to note that 
none of the suits discussed in Part III were criminal. That is, as a doctrinal 
matter, each suit involved a civil plaintiff and a defendant. Judgment in 
favor of the employer-plaintiffs would, of course, have consequences. Unite 
might have been unable to organize the racetrack workers under a neutrality 
agreement in Mulhall,282 and the SEIU might not have been able to hold a 
card-check election in Wackenhut.283 However, neither union (members, or 
leaders) faced prosecution. Even in the briefly discussed context of public 
civil RICO suits, the “United States” acted as plaintiff, rather than 
prosecutor. Despite channeling the rhetorical force of the polity or public 
 
 278.  But cf. supra note 274 (noting that politics also permeated applications of the NLRA and the 
NLRB’s adjudication). 
 279.  See generally MINDA, supra note 108. See also Peter Gabel, The Mass Psychology of the New 
Federalism: How the Burger Court’s Political Imagery Legitimizes the Privatization of Everyday Life, 
52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 263, 268 (1984); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 
57, 81-87, 96-100 (1984); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 
414 (1999); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 1717, 1766 (1997). But see Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 
91 CALIF. L. REV. 1457, 1514 (2003). 
 280.  See generally ATLESON, supra note 79 (critiquing the politics underpinning judicial 
treatments of workers’ rights); MINDA, supra note 108 (examining the ways in which ideology and 
politically laden metaphors shape the legal treatment of labor relations and boycotts, more generally); 
Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, supra note 35 (tracing the impact of free-
market ideology on U.S. labor law and labor injunctions). 
 281.  That is, victory for Mulhall or one of the § 302 plaintiffs would require a judgment that, more 
likely than not, the terms of the neutrality agreement in question violated § 302(a). As the probable 
violation of § 302(a) would be all a prosecutor would need to seek a charge under § 302(d), the civil 
judgment would be the same as the determination sought from a grand jury or required in support of a 
charging document. 
 282.  See supra Part III.B. 
 283.  See Wackenhut Corp. v. SEIU, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1290 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
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interest,284 the state, in these cases, did not pursue prison time (or, at least, 
did not as a part of the same proceeding). But does this mean that “criminal 
labor law” is not criminal after all? 
Perhaps the answer is that criminal law serves as the background 
against which unions operate. Even if police and state violence play no 
explicit role in an organizing campaign, they shape the interactions and 
strategies—unions operate in the shadow of criminal enforcement. As I 
argued in Part II, the legal and social spheres of labor relations have always 
been circumscribed by criminal law and the specter of prosecution. 
A skeptical reader might well ask how union organizing or bargaining 
differs from any other (or, at least, most other conduct): We live in a nation 
that has a police force and has criminal laws, so the threat of arrest for law-
breaking or marginal conduct is always present; yet, would it be fair to 
characterize all social, economic, and political dealings as operating in the 
shadow of criminal law?285 Is a bank customer’s withdrawal from a teller 
governed by criminal law because a police officer stands outside the bank’s 
door? 
Without wading too deeply into this broader set of theoretical 
questions about the threat of implicit state violence, the role of police in 
regulating non-criminal exchanges, and even the nature of the public/private 
distinction in criminal law,286 we can look to history as a means of 
explaining the social meaning of criminal law’s continued relevance in 
labor relations.287 That is, as discussed in Part II, the historical paradigm for 
resolving labor disputes involved the frequent intervention of state forces to 
subdue workers. Indeed, state violence came not only in the form of 
conspiracy prosecutions, but in the enforcement of labor injunctions (i.e. 
suits that were not explicitly criminal).288 Any union or collection of 
 
 284.  Cf. PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-12 (2009) 
(emphasizing the social and cultural significance of captioning criminal cases as “United States v. 
Defendant”). 
 285.  Cf. Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists, supra note 189, at 3 (“I do not mean to dispute that 
there are certain respects in which tort law is public. For one thing it is law, provided by government––
no service, no sheriff, no tort law.”). Put another way, perhaps treating the hypothetical as implicating 
criminal law adopts an over-expansive reading of the function of “background rules” in shaping social 
and economic relations. Cf. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive 
State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 478-79 (1923) (examining the ways in which legal background rules and 
distributions of power shape transactions). 
 286.  Cf. DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 120 
(2008) (“The details of a comprehensive theory of criminalization require nothing less than a theory of 
the state . . . .”). 
 287.  See White, Economic Radicalism, supra note 18, at 653-54. In his work on the International 
Workers of the World, Ahmed White has argued for a broader recognition of the “cultural meaning” of 
the criminal statutes used to prosecute radical labor activists. See generally id. He claims, essentially, 
that these laws are significant not only as a doctrinal matter, but as a means of shaping the legal, social, 
and political landscape in which workers organized and advocated for their economic interests. See id.   
 288.  See Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, supra note 35, at 1185. 
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workers does not operate in a vacuum. Instead, the workers or the 
organizers act in a space shaped by conspiracy prosecutions, by violent 
confrontations, by the “shadow of the racketeer,” and by the nation’s 
history of labor unrest.289 
As Gary Minda has argued, judicial treatment of labor disputes remains 
imbedded in a cultural narrative of labor violence.290 While the Wagner Act 
and the New Deal moment legitimated unions as critical components of a 
democratic society and the national culture,291 legal attacks on unions and 
unionization frequently deploy a very different rhetorical framework, a 
rhetorical framework tied to labor’s criminal history.292 The threat of 
criminal enforcement or criminal intervention in such a space, therefore, 
takes on a specific cultural meaning—a meaning coded with labor’s 
criminal past. 
B. Criminal Labor Law As Illustrative 
But what of the substance of the LMRA and RICO suits and their 
effects? Should we cordon off discussions of civil suits brought under 
criminal statutes from broader discussions about the role of criminal law in 
society? And, perhaps more pointedly, should we view the use of (quasi) 
criminal judgments that go un-accompanied by criminal punishment as a 
social good? Using these questions as a guide, this Section treats this 
discussion of criminal labor law as an entrée into broader debates about 
criminal law’s place in social and economic regulation. Stepping back from 
the discussion of labor’s unique criminal history, the question of 
“punishment” remains a problem for: (1) how to conceptualize criminal 
labor law within the larger framework of civil-criminal hybrids; and (2) 
how to extrapolate out from the discussion of criminal labor law to address 
broader questions about criminal law’s scope as a regulatory institution. 
That is, can there be criminal law without punishment, or what’s “criminal” 
about criminal law if punishment doesn’t follow? 
The absence of punishment, or, perhaps more accurately, the absence 
of punishment as a necessary and direct result of a legal judgment presents 
a particular problem for categorizing, classifying, and critiquing the use of 
RICO and the LMRA. While scholarly opinions vary widely on how to 
 
 289.  See supra Part II. 
 290.  See generally MINDA, supra note 108. 
 291.  See supra Part II.B; see also MICHAEL DENNING, THE CULTURAL FRONT: THE LABORING OF 
AMERICAN CULTURE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1997) (describing positive presentations of 
organized labor in mass culture and chronicling the role of unions in cultural production during the 
1930s).  
 292.  See Crain & Matheny, supra note 12, at 577-78.  
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theorize criminalization or the civil-criminal distinction,293 most accounts of 
criminal law and its distinction from civil liability rest on the role of 
punishment or state violence. In articulating his theory of criminalization, 
Douglas Husak argued that “[a] law simply is not criminal unless persons 
who break it become subject to state punishment . . . .”294 Husak did not 
“doubt the logical coherence of a proscription without a sanction,” but he 
“den[ied] that the proscription would belong to the criminal law.”295 
The clear distinction provided by Husak’s definition certainly holds 
intuitive appeal both theoretically and as a practical matter, due to its easy 
applicability. That being said, other scholars and courts have remained more 
circumspect about the possibility of reducing the distinction to such 
straightforward terms.296 As Husak noted,297 this definitional difficulty 
arises in no small part because of the inability of courts and commentators 
to agree on when sanctions amount to criminal punishment and when they 
remain in the realm of civil penalties.298 In a legal climate characterized by 
expansive criminal liability, as well as a wide range of civil and 
administrative penalties, the line between civil and criminal has blurred.299 
 
 293.  See HUSAK, supra note 286 (examining the expansive role of criminal law and the potential 
for principled boundaries to criminalization); Tadros, supra note 32 (discussing the possible theoretical 
distinction between civil and criminal punishment); Dripps, supra note 32; Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil 
and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2005) (“To the discredit of the 
juristic and legislative professions, the centrality of the distinction between civil and criminal law to our 
jurisprudential paradigm has done nothing to enhance its clarity or cogency. It is no exaggeration to rank 
the distinction among the least well-considered and principled in American legal theory.”); Steiker, 
supra note 33 (describing the theoretical and judicial struggles to define the civil-criminal distinction). 
 294.  HUSAK, supra note 286, at 78. 
 295.  Id. at 78, 78 n.101. 
 296.  See, e.g., Steiker, supra note 33; Tadros, supra note 32. 
 297.  HUSAK, supra note 286, at 79-82. 
 298.  See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1993); United States v. Halper, 490 
U.S. 435, 449 (1989), abrogated by Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997); United States v. 
Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 251 (1980); Steiker, supra note 33, at 809-13; Gregory Y. Porter, Uncivil 
Punishment: The Supreme Court’s Ongoing Struggle with Constitutional Limits on Punitive Civil 
Sanctions, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 517, 523 (1997). 
 299.  See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2002)(“Reevaluating our 
approach to modern day wrongdoing requires consideration of new regulatory tools. This Article 
addresses the tool of private justice.”); Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to 
Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law 
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1325-26 (1991) (“Today, the distinction between criminal and civil 
law seems to be collapsing across a broad front. Although the separation between criminal and civil 
cases is a legal creation both imperfect and incomplete, this basic division has been a hallmark of 
English and American jurisprudence for hundreds of years . . . . Now, however, there is a rapidly 
accelerating tendency for the government to punish antisocial behavior with civil remedies such as 
injunctions, forfeitures, restitution, and civil fines. Sometimes civil approaches completely supplant 
criminal prosecutions . . . . More frequently, civil remedies are blended with or used to supplement 
criminal sanctions, as evidenced by the widespread use of forfeiture in drug cases.”) (footnotes omitted); 
Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the 
Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 327-28 (2008) (“In 
earlier days, criminal law was understood to involve public offenses against society, and civil law was 
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Further, in determining “whether an Act of Congress is penal or regulatory 
in character,”300 the Supreme Court has articulated a set of factors that 
provided little guidance: 
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2] 
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3] whether it 
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation will 
promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, [5] 
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an 
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for 
it, and [7] whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose 
assigned . . . .301 
A cursory reading of these factors illustrates the challenge of applying 
Husak’s rule in practice: as the criminal law and the administrative state 
metastasize, they often coexist or comingle, making “punishment” and 
systemic distinctions highly contingent and uncertain concepts.302 
As a descriptive matter, the criminal-civil distinction may have grown 
increasingly difficult to identify and—at the margins—may be largely 
illusory.303 However, such a conclusion hardly ends our inquiry and hardly 
compels any normative conclusions. If we conclude that legal actions in a 
certain regulatory context straddle the civil-criminal divide to a point that 
any such classification is meaningless, this does not tell us whether we 
should abandon the distinction or attempt to resurrect it.304 Or, to adopt the 
 
understood to govern private disputes between individuals. But this simplistic formulation of the 
boundary between civil and criminal law has become antiquated in the age of the administrative state. 
Now, innumerable civil administrative matters can more fairly be characterized as offenses against 
society than as private disputes. The rise of the administrative state thus necessitated a new model for 
explaining the boundary between civil and criminal proceedings.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 300.  Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963). 
 301.  Id. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted). 
 302.  See generally Bucy, supra note 299, at 4 (discussing the elision of civil and criminal 
regulatory regimes) 
 303.  See Steiker, supra note 33, at 783-84 (“In the latter part of this century, however, this sharp 
distinction [between civil and criminal procedures] has become more difficult for courts to maintain 
with any clarity. This blurring or destabilization of the criminal-civil distinction is partly due to the 
increase in the sheer number of ‘hybrid’ legal institutions and practices: ‘[f]rom civil penalties to 
punitive damages, civil forfeiture to criminal restitution, legal devices that are arguably criminal-civil 
hybrids seem to be more common than they were a century ago.’” (quoting Gail Heriot, An Essay on the 
Civil-Criminal Distinction with Special Reference to Punitive Damages, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
43, 44 (1996))). 
 304.  By way of analog, challenging the distinction between “public” and “private” does not 
compel the conclusion that all things private should be public or that we should embrace a more 
powerful state. That the theoretical grounding for private property, private speech, or privacy may be 
shaky does not require us to embrace a stronger state. It simply means that an argument for “private” 
rests on a normative preference for a certain social ordering, rather than an internally coherent general 
theory.  
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Legal Realist formulation, determining what the law “is” does not tell us 
what the law “ought” to be.305 
There may be good reason to bristle at the elision of civil and criminal. 
In United States v. United Mine Workers of America,306 Justice Rutledge 
emphasized the strong U.S. preference for a hard divide between civil and 
criminal spheres in the context of a much-publicized labor dispute: 
In any other context than one of contempt, the idea that a criminal 
prosecution and a civil suit for damages or equitable relief could be hashed 
together in a single criminal-civil hodgepodge would be shocking to every 
American lawyer and to most citizens. True, the same act may give rise to 
all these varied legal consequences. But we have never adopted, rather our 
Constitution has totally rejected the continental system of compounding 
criminal proceedings with civil adjudications.307 
Whether the distinction was ever as clear as Justice Rutledge asserted 
is a historical question that falls outside the scope of this Article;308 
nevertheless, it is worth noting that the distinction clearly played a strong 
theoretical and rhetorical role in structuring the U.S. legal system. As 
discussed above, to the extent that the U.S. legal system retains criminal 
law and a specific subset of laws that can trigger incarceration or other 
criminal sanctions, there must be some reason for the distinction. While 
criminal law and civil regulatory spaces may have become harder to 
distinguish, it still seems imperative that we retain some justification for 
why some laws can trigger punishment, incarceration, and severe restraints 
on liberty. 
Perhaps, then, the issue ultimately raised by the “criminal labor law” 
suits becomes one of criminal law without punishment. As discussed above, 
the sticking point in scholarly and judicial accounts of the distinction tends 
to be whether to categorize the harm visited upon the defendant as 
“punishment” or some other, non-criminal sanction.309 And, in the case of 
the RICO and LMRA suits discussed in Part III, the explicit state violence 
of criminal prosecution and punishment is clearly lacking. Nevertheless, the 
legal principles at issue remain criminal, and the logic of the suits—if 
endorsed by courts—might well support criminal prosecution. Therefore, 
viewed expansively, criminal labor law may represent a space in which 
 
 305.  See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism – Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. 
L. REV. 1222, 1254 (1931). 
 306.  330 U.S. 258 (1947).   
 307.  Id. at 364 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
 308.  Cf. Steiker, supra note 33, at 782 (“To speak of the ‘destabilization’ of anything is to imply 
that there was a time of stability. In the case of the criminal-civil distinction, this would be a somewhat 
misleading implication. The distinction between criminal and civil wrongs, and the nature of the 
processes used to address them, have never been static, but rather have continuously changed over time, 
often dramatically.”). 
 309.  See supra notes 294-302 and accompanying text. 
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criminal law operates without criminal punishment as a necessary 
accompaniment of culpability or liability. 
This specter of criminal law without punishment necessarily poses a 
major challenge for criminal law scholars concerned with the dual plagues 
of mass incarceration and overcriminalization. Husak defined 
overcriminalization as having: (1) too many crimes; and (2) too much 
punishment.310 But should we still be troubled by the presence of too many 
substantive offenses if those offenses do not necessarily lead to further 
punishment or to the ratcheting up of the U.S. carceral culture? If one of the 
great difficulties for progressive criminal law scholars, prison abolitionists, 
and others critical of the nation’s criminal justice system is how to deal with 
misfeasance while avoiding the pathologies of our carceral system,311 
should criminal labor law be an appealing alternate model? The RICO and 
LMRA suits may have a public de-legitimating effect for unions, and they 
may impose assorted social, economic, and political costs on unions, but 
these suits do not carry with them the clear costs of criminalization and 
criminal prosecutions. Even if criminal labor law might cause concern for 
labor activists, might it serve as a helpful model for criminal justice reform 
scholars? 
Put simply, no. While “criminal law without punishment” might retain 
an intuitive appeal for de-carceration scholars and might indeed have some 
place in the criminal justice system,312 its application in the labor context 
should serve as a warning rather than an invitation. As Jonathan Simon, 
David Garland, Bernard Harcourt, and other critics of criminal law’s 
expansive reach have argued, the criminal law explosion has resulted from 
the normalization of criminal statutes as the operative regulatory paradigm 
in structuring disparate corners of social and economic life.313 In a society in 
which the state has taken to “governing through crime,”314 criminal statutes, 
police, and the other vehicles of administering criminal justice take the 
place of regulators or civil servants.315 When a new social problem arises, or 
when public opinion supports the disciplining of a certain market or set of 
market actors, the default means of legal redress has increasingly become 
 
 310.  See HUSAK, supra note 286, at 3-4. 
 311.  See Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting 
Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1589-91 (2012). 
 312.  Providing a descriptive and normative account of what “criminal law without punishment” 
does, might, or should look like would be a separate project. 
 313.  See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); HARCOURT, supra note 34; JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING 
THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A 
CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); Aharonson, supra note 238.  
 314.  See generally SIMON, supra note 313. 
 315.  See HARCOURT, supra note 34 (articulating a theory of “neoliberal penality” in which 
criminal law has replaced civil or administrative regulatory regimes). 
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criminal.316 Despite partisan gridlock and political strife, criminal statutes 
continue to emerge unscathed from legislatures as ostensible evidence of 
the state’s continued potency.317 
In the 1960s, Sanford Kadish argued that “criminal law is a highly 
specialized tool of social control, useful for certain purposes but not for 
others[,]” and “when improperly used[,] it is capable of producing more evil 
than good . . . .”318 But in the current political climate, criminal law 
frequently becomes a place of bipartisan agreement and the institutional 
mechanism of choice. Rather than a “highly specialized tool,” it has become 
a legislative Swiss Army Knife—the trusty aide produced to tinker with any 
problem presented. 
Given these “political pathologies” of criminal law,319 the quasi-
criminal suits discussed in Part III should be of particular concern. While 
they might be appealing as a means of enforcing legal, moral, and market 
norms without resorting to the (socially and economically) costly institution 
of prosecution,320 they also risk further normalizing criminal law and 
entrenching it as a regulatory default. That is, in weighing the costs and 
benefits of criminal law, most critics of criminalization focus on the costs 
associated with punishment.321 The growing opposition to the War on 
Drugs, for example, tends to center on the problems with punishment.322 As 
society has been forced to confront the ugly realities of mass incarceration, 
the social reformist promise of criminal law in this realm has lost its luster. 
But what if—as in Mulhall—we remove punishment from the 
criminalization equation, not by eliminating the state’s authorization to 
punish, but by making it unlikely that the state will act on this 
authorization? 
 
 316.  See Brown, Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph, supra note 34, at 660-61; HARCOURT, 
supra note 34, at 203-08; Benjamin Levin, De-Naturalizing Criminal Law: Of Public Perceptions and 
Procedural Protections, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1777, 1794-1803 (2013). 
 317.  See, e.g., NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES (2008) (discussing the impact of electoral politics on 
the expanding criminal code); Aharonson, supra note 238, at 302-03; James B. Jacobs & David Kairys, 
Debate, Can Handguns Be Effectively Regulated?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 188, 190 (2007) (“There are many 
types of gun control that range from imprisoning armed felons to imposing tort liability on 
manufacturers. The most politically popular type of gun control in the U.S. is the severe punishment of 
crimes committed with firearms. All Americans support severe sentences for firearms offenders, except 
for those who advocate reduced punishment and imprisonment across the board.”). 
 318.  Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 7 AM. CRIM. L. Q. 17, 33 (1968). 
 319.  See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 505 (2001).  
 320.  See Cheh, supra note 299, at 1345. 
 321.  See supra notes 310-311. 
 322.  See, e.g., United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 494 (6th Cir. 2013), vacated en banc, 746 
F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1779 (2014); Juan R. Torruella, Déjà Vu: A Federal 
Judge Revisits the War on Drugs, or Life in a Balloon, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 167, 195-98 (2011). 
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If the only way to check the political pathology of overcriminalization 
is to force the polity to confront and internalize the costs of punishment, the 
“crime without punishment” of criminal labor law poses a great risk. 
Stripped of criminal law’s obvious costs—costs that have spurred criticism 
of the War on Drugs, stop and frisk, mandatory minimum sentences, and so 
forth—the RICO and LMRA suits allow for criminal law’s continued 
expansion in an unsettlingly anodyne fashion. Considering the difficult time 
that scholars, attorneys, and activists have had persuading politicians, 
voters, and judges not to gloss over criminal law’s costs, the doctrinal space 
that further obfuscates the costs makes criminal labor law a dangerous 
marker of criminalization’s creeping regulatory force. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
RICO, § 302, and the continued relevance of criminal statutes in the 
union context tell us a lot about the nature of labor law itself. But labor law, 
as a space shaped by both civil and criminal statutes and principles, has a 
great deal to tell us about how criminal law operates as an institutional and 
social-structuring mechanism. An area ignored in most scholarly discussion 
and absent from most treatments of criminal law’s reach and social impact, 
“criminal labor law” defies the logic, the strictures, and the structures of 
criminal law as it has been theorized and accepted. Similarly, it defies the 
frameworks and framings of post-1935 labor law. 
Defined by statute and by views about the proper structuring of the 
market and of economic relationships, it is not a realm of malum in se 
criminality.323 Arguably corrupt labor leaders and overzealous organizers do 
not grace the FBI’s most wanted list. And, when we imagine the 
prototypical acts that any theory of punishment must condemn,324 the facts 
of Cintas or Mulhall probably do not come to mind. Indeed, the suits that I 
have identified as a part of contemporary criminal labor law may even fail 
to guarantee punishment,325 rendering their status as “criminal law” suspect. 
But, if we accept the proposition that labor law has always been deeply 
imbedded in cultural assumptions about how society and markets should be 
structured,326 or about the relationship between the state and its citizens,327 
 
 323.  See HUSAK, supra note 286, at 103-19 (discussing the role of the malum in se/malum 
prohibitum distinction in the culture of overcriminalization). 
 324.  See generally Donald Braman et al., Some Realism About Punishment Naturalism, 77 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1531 (2010) (discussing cultural intuitions about what conduct should be considered criminal or 
morally culpable). 
 325.  See supra Part III. 
 326.  See ATLESON, supra note 79, at 3; Richard Michael Fischl, Symposium, It’s Conflict All the 
Way Down, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 773, 775-77 (2001). 
 327.  See TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY, supra note 15, at 118. 
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then the potential return to a criminal or quasi-criminal paradigm for the 
regulation of organized labor might suggest a powerful naturalization of the 
criminal model. That is, the potential return to criminal statutes as a legal 
vehicle through which to address debates about unionization and workplace 
democracy should be cause for great concern not only to labor law scholars, 
but to those concerned about the crisis of overcriminalization. In a world 
where criminal statutes fill gaps in the web of the administrative state, and 
where the language of criminal liability dominates many conversations of 
social and economic policy, the paradigmatic regulatory device too often 
becomes the criminal statute. 
As the new labor law scholars have argued compellingly, moments of 
regulatory failure or ossification may provide an exciting moment for 
attorneys, activists, and scholars to shape new legal regimes and political 
spaces.328 It would be difficult to dispute that changing economic, social, 
and political factors have made much of the NLRA model outdated or 
outmoded. But the Act offers a range of important lessons that courts and 
legislators should remember, even as labor lawyers and scholars begin to 
look elsewhere. Perhaps most important is the recognition that organized 




 328.  See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text. 
